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ABSTRACT 
 
The present research explored whether infants and toddlers would have early expectations of 
socio-moral norms. In particular, we asked whether and how children’s expectations about reciprocity 
would be modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty. Chapter 2 focused on the idea of “escalation” 
and provided evidence that infants expect an individual to retaliate more severely against an outgroup 
member than against an ingroup member. Chapter 3 focused on the idea of “co-retaliation” and suggested 
that both infants and toddlers expect an individual to retaliate against an outgroup member who had 
previously hindered the individual’s group member. Chapter 4 focused on the idea of “privilege” and 
showed that toddlers expect an individual to act more positively in response to a friendly overture by an 
ingroup member than by an outgroup member. 
Experiments described in this dissertation provide converging evidence that infants and toddlers 
have rudimentary socio-moral expectations about actions and interactions within social contexts; they are 
sensitive to various markers of social groups; and their expectations of reciprocity are modulated by 
considerations of ingroup loyalty. These socio-moral expectations emerge early in life and are likely to be 
based on a small set of innate socio-moral principles. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
When young children are in social situations, such as on the playground, their parents often 
remind them: “wait for your turn,” “don’t push,” “say thank you,” “be nice to your friends,” and so on. 
Also, in children’s literature, as in Aesop’s fable or Grimm's Fairy Tales for example, a moral lesson is 
often included in order to teach children social and moral norms. But when do children start to show 
sensitivity to norms? And what norms do young children first apply to interactions among individuals?  
1. Views on the origin of morality 
 The origin of morality has been one of the most hotly debated topics in intellectual history. 
Psychologists have formed two major views about where our moral sense comes from. The late-
acquisition view states that the acquisition of morality does not begin until the preschool years or even 
later; and hence children come into the world with a very limited innate basis for socio-moral 
understanding (note: psychologists coined the term socio-morality to refer to moral behaviors and 
judgments that occur within a social context). In contrast, the early-emergence view states that children 
are born with a rich innate basis for understanding social interactions and hence sensitivity to moral 
norms emerges early in life. Below is a brief review of both the late-acquisition and the early-emergence 
views. 
1.1. Late-acquisition view 
 The late-acquisition view argues that children are not born with a moral sense; instead, they 
acquire morality through experience. This view has been studied in two main approaches. The 
socialization-based approach examines how parental discipline practices and other socialization processes 
help children internalize and conform to societal norms.  In contrast, the construction-based approach 
adopts a more cognitive stance that explores how children gradually construct moral concepts and norms 
through social interactions.  
1.1.1. Socialization-based approach 
The socialization-based approach focuses on how social experiences make children behave in 
ways that are consistent with societal standards, or even selfless. According to the psychoanalytic theory, 
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great tension exists between an individual and society. For Freud (1923/1962), the tension is rooted in the 
incompatibility of the individual’s instinctual impulses and society’s function of protecting its members 
from individual aggressive tendencies. People develop a moral sense when their instinctual need for self-
gratification becomes transformed through the acquisition of a conscience. Children identify with the 
parent of the same sex and internalize parental and cultural values. These values are incorporated into 
children’s conscience and become their moral guide. Children also internalize guilt, shame, fear and 
anxiety as the means for regulating behaviors.   
Learning theory conceptualizes the acquisition of morality in a different way. Skinner (1971) 
argued that people develop a moral sense as their behaviors are reinforced or punished by value 
judgments that are based on societal standards. Behaviors themselves are not intrinsically good or bad. 
Children learn to identify acts as legal, illegal, pious, or sinful as a consequence of contingencies of 
reinforcement. Learned behaviors do not reflect the nature of a person’s character, but are constrained by 
effective contingencies in the environment. 
Both the psychoanalytic and learning theories focus on the central role of aversive emotions (e.g., 
fear, anxiety, shame, and guilty) in the acquisition of morality. As the influences of these theories waned 
over the years, the scope of inquiry was broadened to include and even emphasize the role of the positive 
emotions (e.g., attachment, bonding, love, sympathy and empathy) in socio-moral development. For 
example, research has found that maternal responsiveness (contingent, appropriate responding) to their 
infants at 9 months predicted higher levels of empathic responses in toddlers at 22 months (Kochanska, 
Forman, & Coy, 1999). In addition, practices of inductive discipline, in which parents or teachers give 
explanations or reasons for requiring children to change behavior, are more likely to promote the 
children’s prosocial tendency than practices of power-assertive discipline (Hoffman, 1970, 2000). 
1.1.2. Construction-based approach 
According to both the psychoanalytic and learning theories, morality is the result of passive 
internalization. An individual’s behavior is compelled by either an internalized superego or by formed 
habits. In contrast, the construction-based approach does not consider morality to be an external 
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imposition on children. Instead, children themselves actively construct moral judgments about how people 
should act toward one another as children participate in social interactions with adults and peers. 
In his early writings, Piaget (1932/1965) studied children’s knowledge and judgments about 
morality. Consistent with his general view of cognitive development, he stressed that children construct 
and reconstruct their moral thinking through interactions with the environment. Piaget described moral 
reasoning as moving from heteronomy to autonomy. In the "heteronomous" stage of moral reasoning, 
children strictly obey authority and adhere to prescribed rules and duties. Through overcoming 
egocentrism and taking perspective of others, children make progress toward the “autonomous” stage. 
They start to consider rules critically, and selectively apply these rules based on goals of mutual respect 
and cooperation.  
Kohlberg (1969) modified and elaborated Piaget’s formulation, and further proposed a detailed 
scheme for conceptualizing and measuring moral development as a form of cognitive development. In his 
studies, children were asked to resolve moral dilemmas and to provide justification for their judgment. 
Kohlberg found a stage-like development of moral judgment.  At the pre-conventional level, moral 
judgments are made based on obedience, punishment avoidance, and an instrumental need and exchange. 
At the conventional level, moral judgments are made based on role obligations and conventional 
conceptions of good people, such as respecting the rules and authority legitimated in the social system.  
At the post-conventional level, moral judgments are made beyond one’s society and justice rules, but 
based on contractual agreements, established procedural arrangements for resolving conflicts, mutual 
respect, and differentiated concepts of justice and rights. 
Contemporary researchers continued this line of work by Piaget and Kohlberg, and examined 
children’s reasoning and the development of cognitive structures related to morality (e.g., Killen & 
Smetana, 2006; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). For example, Turiel and his colleagues argued 
that children’s judgments of moral acts are independent of conventional aspects of the social system, such 
as requests from authority figures or the presence of explicit rules (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Turiel, 1983, 
2006; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). Also, Hoffman (1982) and Eisenberg (1989, 1998) proposed that 
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children’s perspective-taking abilities facilitate the development of prosocial tendency, such as empathy 
and sympathy toward others. These studies on prosociality have also been synthesized with investigations 
in primatology (e.g., Preston & de Waal, 2002) and neuroscience (e.g., Singer et al., 2006). 
1.2. Early-emergence view 
The late-acquisition view generally assumes that socio-moral expectations do not emerge until the 
preschool years. Recently, this assumption has been challenged by widespread speculations that children 
are born with a rich innate basis for understanding social interactions. This early-emergence view 
proposes that moral development builds on early-emerging socio-moral intuitions about how individuals 
should act toward one another (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Dupoux & Jacob, 2007; Dwyer, 2007; 
Greene, 2005; Haidt, 2008; Jackendoff, 2007; Mikhail, 2007; Premack, 2007; Sigmund, Fehr, & Novak, 
2002; Wynn, 2008).  
Researchers with the early-emergence view argue that the human brain is programmed to make it 
easy to learn certain things and difficult to learn other things. As Marcus (2004) described, “The initial 
organization of the brain does not rely that much on experience… Nature provides a first draft, which 
experience then revises…‘Built-in’ does not mean unmalleable; it means organized in advance of 
experience.” (Marcus, 2004, p. 12) 
This early-emergence view can be further divided into two major approaches. One approach 
emphasizes the role of emotions in the generation and development of moral judgments (emotion-based 
approach). The other approach emphasizes the role of tacit principles in children’s reasoning about social 
interactions (principle-based approach). 
1.2.1. Emotion-based approach 
As discussed above, the construction-based approach (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983) 
argues that moral knowledge and moral judgments are reached primarily by a process of conscious, 
language-based reasoning. However, some researchers (e.g., Haidt, 2001) propose that moral emotions, or 
“gut feelings,” actually come first. These feelings directly cause post-hoc constructions, which people 
generate to justify their implicit and automatic emotions. Haidt’s argument was built on philosophical 
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claims by Hume who considered moral reasoning to be “the slave of the passions.” Hume said that “the 
ultimate ends of human actions can never… be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves 
entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind” (1777/1966, p. 131).  
Therefore, if moral emotions drive moral reasoning, then moral judgment is primarily a bottom-
up process that is triggered by external stimuli rather than by concepts or principles in one’s mind. For 
example, in a study (Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000), upon hearing a story that a brother and a sister 
made love during a summer vacation, most participants immediately felt disgusted and said that it was 
wrong. If asked why they felt this way, they then began searching for reasons. They pointed out the 
dangers of inbreeding, even though birth control was implemented; they argued that the siblings would be 
hurt, perhaps emotionally, even though the story made it clear that no harm befell them. 
1.2.2. Principle-based approach 
In contrast to the emotion-based approach, which advocates the causal role of emotions in 
generating moral intuitions, the principle-based approach argues that emotions are the byproduct of moral 
judgments. According to the latter, infants are born with tacit principles dedicated specially for socio-
moral reasoning. These principles are deployed without awareness and can hardly be explicitly articulated. 
Two accounts of the principle-based approach have been offered: the “universal moral grammar” account 
and the “moral causal framework” account.  
The “universal moral grammar” account (e.g., Mikhail, 2007; Raw, 1971) was developed based 
on an analogy between the study of moral cognition and Chomsky’s generative linguistics research 
program (e.g., Chomsky, 1965; 1975). Chomsky argues that people’s language comprehension and 
production abilities rely on their tacit knowledge of a grammatical system, of which they are not aware. 
The grammatical system is a network of computational principles connected to a finite set of binary 
parameters (similar to binary switches). In each human language, the parameters are instantiated with a 
particular setting. With this built-in computational system, children can easily learn their local languages 
from a finite and fragmentary sample of linguistic input. 
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Similar to grammatical judgments, moral judgments may result from complex and unconscious 
computations involving abstract computational principles. For example, in some studies using the “trolley 
dilemmas” (e.g., Thomson, 1971), participants were presented with scenarios in which a bystander 
sacrificed one person to save five, and all scenarios ended with the same number of casualties. The 
participants considered it more acceptable for a bystander to sacrifice that person when the person’s death 
was merely a foreseen consequence than when it was an intended consequence of the bystander’s act. 
This minimal contrast between trolley dilemmas seemed to have been taken into account when the 
participants unconsciously computed their moral judgments. 
However, the analogy between morality and linguistics may not be feasible. Speakers of two 
distinct languages can hold irreconcilably divergent grammatical intuitions (e.g., whether or not nouns 
precede adjectives). But many moral reactions are widely shared among members of various cultures 
(Rozin et al., 1999; Shweder et al., 1995). For example, most cultures consider murder and rape as 
unacceptable. The similarities of moral intuitions across cultures cannot be derived from the arbitrary 
outcomes of the culture-dependent parameters in the moral grammar system, but they are more likely to 
reflect a small set of universal moral norms, with which humans are equipped at birth. 
To better interpret the cross-cultural similarity of moral intuition, the “moral causal framework” 
account proposed that infants are born with a skeletal causal framework for interpreting social 
interactions among individuals (e.g., Dupoux & Jacob, 2007; Dwyer, 2007; Geraci & Surian, in press; 
Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, 2007; Jackendoff, 2007; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Premack, 2007; Wynn, 2008). 
This system operates based on a small set of universal moral principles. Moral diversity across cultures 
may due to different moral adjudication among competing moral intuitions. Each culture has its own 
elaboration and ranking of members of a finite set of universal moral principles (Dupoux & Jacob, 2007). 
For example, some individualistic cultures put more weight on individual’s privacy than on ingroup 
loyalty, while other cultures may show the reverse preference ordering of the two norms. 
7 
 
2. Documented socio-moral norms 
Researchers have started to look at which socio-moral norms might emerge early in life. Below 
are some examples of moral norms that researchers have investigated. 
2.1. Norm of reciprocity 
According to the norm of reciprocity, if A acts in some way toward B, and B chooses to respond, 
then B’s action should match that of A in value, though not necessarily match in form. The norm of 
reciprocity can be separated into two corollaries: reciprocation, stating that B should act positively (or 
reciprocate) in response to a positive action, and retaliation, stating that B should act negatively (or 
retaliate) in response to a negative action. Reciprocity specifies how an individual should act in response 
to another’s action, and is as such conceptually distinct from altruism and other prosocial behaviors (e.g., 
Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006). 
Researchers from diverse fields—including anthropology, economics, linguistics, psychology, 
and sociology—have argued that reciprocity is one of the fundamental norms guiding human social 
interactions (e.g., Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Fry, 2006; Gouldner, 1960; Jackendoff, 2007; Premack, 1990). 
Adults possess an abstract calculating system that describes the effect of an individual’s action upon 
another individual (e.g. Jackendoff, 2006). This value system is composed of two dimensions: valence 
and magnitude. Valence describes whether an individual’s action exerts a positive, negative, or neutral 
effect on others, while magnitude describes how strong the effect is. By combining the concepts of 
valence and magnitude, people reason about individuals’ actions and interactions. Jackendoff (2006) 
studied the acceptability of linguistic expressions concerning valence and magnitude in social interaction. 
For example, people expect a negative action in return for a negative action, as in the scenario “Fred 
slashed Lois’s tires for insulting his sister”. On the other hand, people find it absurd if Lois’s initial action 
and Fred’s reaction do not match in valence. For example, “Fred cooked Lois dinner for insulting his 
sister”.  In addition, people find it odd if Lois’s initial action and Fred’s reaction mismatch in magnitude 
even though they match in valence. The scenario “Fred slashed Lois’s tires for eating too little at dinner” 
is an over-reaction, while the scenario “Fred slashed Lois’s tires for murdering his entire family” is an 
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under-reaction (Jackendoff, 2006, p. 395). 
Beginning with Piaget’s seminal work (1932/1965), developmental psychologists have long been 
interested in determining at what age and under what conditions children demonstrate an expectation of 
reciprocity. Investigations using first-party situations examine whether children show reciprocity in their 
own responses to others’ actions. Investigations using third-party situations test whether children appeal 
to reciprocity when interpreting or evaluating others’ actions. There is considerable evidence, from 
various first- and third-party investigations, that children aged 6 years and older understand and adhere to 
the norm of reciprocity (e.g., Berndt, 1977; Dahlman, Ljungqvist, & Johannesson, 2007; Darley, Klosson, 
& Zanna, 1978; Staub & Sherk, 1970; Suls, Witenberg, & Gutkin, 1981). 
Studies with 3- to 5-year-olds have also yielded a number of positive findings. First, naturalistic 
observations in preschool settings indicate that young children show reciprocity when interacting with 
peers (e.g., Fujisawa, Kutsukake, & Hasegawa, 2008; Leiter, 1977; Strayer, Wareing, & Rushton, 1979). 
For example, Fujisawa et al. (2008) observed Japanese 3- and 4-year-olds at their nursery school for a 
year and examined how often they reciprocated two positive actions, helping and object offering, during 
free-play time. At each age, children reciprocated both behaviors; helping was reciprocated about equally 
with friends and non-friends, but object offering was reciprocated more with friends. Second, first-party 
experimental tasks with young children have also produced encouraging results (e.g., Dahlman et al., 
2007; Levitt, Weber, Clark, & McDonnell, 1985). For example, Dahlman et al. (2007) divided 3-to 5-
year-old Swedish children into anonymous pairs of givers and recipients. During the first phase of the 
procedure, the giver chose between giving the recipient a reward (a bag of raisins) or no reward. During 
the second phase, the recipient chose between the same two options for the giver. Recipients were 
somewhat more likely to give a reward if they had received one in the first phase than if they had received 
none. Finally, some evidence of sensitivity to reciprocity was also found in a third-party task with 3- to 5-
year-olds (Berndt, 1979): children were more likely to invoke retaliation to explain cartoon characters’ 
negative actions when provoked. Therefore, children by 3 to 5 years of age show sensitivity to the norm 
of reciprocity in some first- and third-party situations. The question is whether this sensitivity is already 
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present in infancy, or if it emerges in the toddler or preschool years. 
Some evidence shows that infants assign valences (positive, neutral, or negative) to actions when 
watching two individuals interact (e.g. Hamlin et al., 2007; Kuhlmeier et al., 2003; Premack, 1990; 
Premack & Premack, 1997). For example, in the experiments by Premack and Premack (1997), one-year-
old infants were first habituated to one of four events involving two self-propelled agents, a grey and a 
black ball: the hit-vertical (i.e. the grey ball pursued and struck the black ball vertically several times), the 
caress (i.e. the grey ball had gentle contacts with the black ball), the help (i.e. the grey ball helped the 
black ball get over a barrier), and the hinder event (i.e. the grey ball prevented the black ball from getting 
over a barrier). Next, all the infants were presented with the same test event: a hit-horizontal event (i.e. 
the grey ball pursued and struck the black ball horizontally several times). The infants who were 
habituated to a positive event (i.e., help or caress) showed a substantial dishabituation to the negative test 
event, but those who were habituated to a negative event (i.e., hinder or hit-vertical) showed little or no 
dishabituation to the negative test event. These findings suggested that infants discriminate between 
actions directed at others that have a positive (beneficial) valence and those that have a negative 
(detrimental) valence. Specially, they view caressing and helping as positive but hitting and hindering as 
negative.  
Infants not only distinguish valences of actions, but also understand that valences have 
consequences for subsequent interactions. Infants prefer—and expect others to prefer—individuals who 
produce positive as opposed to negative actions (e.g., Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Moreover, infants 
tend to act positively in response to another individual’s well-intended actions (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 
2010). For example, infants at the age of 21 months selectively help those who have shown a willingness 
to provide. They preferred to help an individual who previously intended to provide a toy (either with or 
without successful outcomes) over an individual who was unwilling to provide. Similarly, toddlers 
selectively avoid helping people with harmful intention (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010). 3-year-
olds watched an adult harm another adult. Subsequently, the children helped the harmful adult less often 
than a third (previously neutral) adult; also, they helped an actor who intended but failed to harm another 
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adult less often than a neutral adult. 
Prior study also suggests that infants expect individuals to reciprocate or retaliate in accordance 
with the norm of reciprocity (He, Bolz, Baillargeon, Premack, under review). In the experiments, 15-
month-old infants watched a live two-part vignette involving two unfamiliar female experimenters, A and 
B. In the first part of each vignette, A acted either positively or negatively toward B; in the second part, B 
now acted either positively or negatively toward A. Infants detected a violation (as indicated by longer 
looking times) when B acted negatively in response to A’s positive action, or when B acted positively in 
response to A’s negative action.  For example, after seeing A steal B’s cookie, infants were surprised if B 
helped A put away her sticker, but not if B tore up A’s sticker. These results indicate that infants in their 
second year of life already hold a rudimentary tit-for-tat stance on social interactions: infants expect 
reciprocal actions to match initial actions in valence, but recognize that they need not match in form. 
2.2. Norm of ingroup loyalty 
The norm of ingroup loyalty states that individuals in a social group tend to act in ways that 
support the group. For example, individuals should prefer ingroup over outgroup members, should 
provide assistance and cooperation to ingroup members, and should act to maintain positivity and 
harmony within groups (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Kinzler et al., 2007, 2011; Mahajan & 
Wynn, 2010; Shutts et al., 2009; Werneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007).  
Some evidence suggests that infants are already sensitive to social groups. Infants appear to be 
sensitive to ways of aggregating individuals by race, gender, age, language, shared preference and so on. 
They seem to notice various dimensions of similarities and differences among people, which signal 
different social groups. Based on these dimensions, infants form a preference for ingroup over outgroup 
members. 
 For example, infants as young as 3 months prefer to look at faces of their own race over those of 
a different race (e.g. Kelly et al., 2005). This visual preference based on racial differences is not present in 
the first days of life, but is learned and derived from differences in exposure to own- versus other-race 
faces within the first three months of life. These findings are consistent with those from studies examining 
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the influence of infants’ prototypical racial environment on infants’ racial preference. Evidence shows 
that infants prefer the race that they have more exposure to. For example, Israeli infants from Caucasian 
families prefer to look at Caucasian over African faces, and Ethiopian infants from African families prefer 
to look at African over Caucasian faces. However, Israeli infants from African families, living in a 
predominantly Caucasian culture, show no consistent preferences (Bar-Haim et al., 2006). Moreover, 
infants become more accurate at processing faces of their own race than those of other races before their 
first birthday (e.g. Kelly, et al, 2007; Anzures, et al, 2009), a bias that is maintained during later 
childhood (e.g. Shutts & Kinzler, 2007).  
 Findings from studies on infants’ gender preference are also consistent with those on racial 
preference. For example, infants aged 3 to 4 months prefer to look at faces of the same gender as their 
primary caregiver. That is, regardless of whether they themselves are male or female, infants reared with 
female primary caregivers tend to show a preference for female faces, but infants reared with male 
primary caregivers prefer male faces (e.g. Quinn et al., 2002). In addition, 12-month old children tend to 
choose dolls that are most like the children themselves in gender and in race (e.g. Katz, 2002). 
 Besides gender and race, age is another powerful guide for young children’s social preferences. 
For example, 3-year-old children show a bias toward people of their own age. If 3-year-old boys were 
asked to choose between two toys, one offered by another boy and one offered by a male adult, they were 
more likely to choose the toy from the boy (e.g. Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2009).  
 Infants also prefer people who speak the language of their own speech community. For example, 
6-month-old infants from mono-lingual American English family watched alternating films showing two 
adult women speaking in American English and Spanish (both women were bilingual so that each of them 
spoke Spanish to half the infants and English to the others). The women were then presented side by side, 
smiling but silent. The infants looked longer at the woman who had spoken to them in English, their 
native language (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007). A similar preference was found even in neonates 
(Mehler et al., 1993). What’s more, variations of accents can also make a difference: 5-month-olds prefer 
looking at individuals who previously spoke their native language with a native accent as opposed to a 
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foreign accent. With age, they show a more explicit social preference beyond their visual preference: 10-
month-olds reach for toys that are offered by a speaker of their native language rather than by a speaker of 
a foreign language (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007). 
In addition, infants tend to act more positive toward people with whom they share preferences. In 
a series of studies, Mahajan and Wynn (2010) demonstrated that, like adults, infants 7 to 14 months of 
age prefer to interact with those who share trivial similarities to themselves.  Specifically, infants who 
choose between two items (two distinct snacks, toys, or mittens) prefer individuals who make the same 
choice over those who choose the opposite. Infants’ performance in a control condition also suggests that 
these preferences are based on a cognitive comparison process (“like me”/”different from me”), rather 
than reflecting associative preferences. 
Finally, prosocial behaviors such as helping, which are tied to ingroup loyalty, can be 
manipulated by merely priming with affiliation. In a study by Over and Carpenter (2009), 18-month-old 
infants’ helping behavior was measured after being primed with photographs in one of the four 
conditions: in the affiliation condition, two small dolls stood next to each other in the background of a 
familiar household object; in the individual condition, a single doll stood alone in the background of 
otherwise identical photographs; in the neutral, non-social condition, two small stacks of blocks were 
placed in the background; and in the non-affiliative relation condition, the two dolls stood back to back. 
All the photographs had similar foregrounds, but their backgrounds varied depending on the condition. 
The infants provided assistance to an unfamiliar experimenter more often and more spontaneously in the 
affiliation condition than in the other three conditions. Hence, infants’ prosocial behavior can be 
promoted if their mindset of ingroup loyalty is activated. 
2.3. Other norms 
In addition to the norms of reciprocity and ingroup loyalty, researchers have also investigated a 
number of other socio-moral norms, such as the norms of fairness, welfare, and hierarchy.  
The norm of fairness states that individuals should deal fairly with others. Research on fairness in 
adults from Western cultures have shown that adults are more interested in fair play than in self-gain (e.g., 
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Camerer, 2003; Guth, Schmittberger, & Scharze, 1982; Henrich et al., 2001; Sigmund, Fehr, & Novak, 
2002). Similar results have been observed in different cultures around the world, leading researchers to 
speculate that a concern for fairness may be innate in humans, and may have evolved during the millions 
of years that our ancestors lived in small bands of hunter-gatherers, when survival depended on the fair 
sharing of resources and efforts (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Novak, Page, 
& Sigmund, 2000; Premack & Premack, 2003). Similarly, children also demonstrate a concern for 
fairness (e.g., Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Sutter, 2007; Turiel, 1983). 
For example, in a study by Olson and Speke (2008), 3.5-year-old children were presented with five dolls: 
one was identified as the protagonist and the other four were identified either as the protagonist’s siblings, 
as the protagonist’s friends, or as strangers. The children were asked to help the protagonist distribute 
resources to the other dolls (e.g., divide two, three or four stickers among two siblings and two strangers). 
When the number of resources and recipients were equal, children directed the protagonist to share 
resources equally with all potential recipients; but when the number of available resources was smaller 
than the number of recipients, children directed the protagonist to share more with family and friends than 
with strangers (i.e., consistent with the norm of ingroup loyalty).  
Recent research found that even infants have some rudimentary expectations that individuals 
should act fairly when distributing resources between other individuals or when rewarding others for their 
efforts. For example, in a recent study by Geraci and Surian (in press), 16-month-olds first saw a “fair 
distributor” perform equal distributions toward two recipients and an “unfair distributor” perform unequal 
distributions toward another recipients, while a bystander observed all the distributive actions.  Infants 
looked reliably longer when the bystander approached the “fair distributor” than when the bystander 
approached the “unfair distributor.” Infants’ manual choices between the two distributors also reveal their 
preference toward the “fair distributor” over the “unfair distributor.” Moreover, in the experiments of 
Sloane, Baillargeon, and Premack (under review), 19-month-old infants viewed events in which an 
experimenter distributed two toys unfairly between two giraffe puppets as unexpected.   
14 
 
The norm of welfare states that individuals should refrain from doing serious harm to others and 
should help others who are in distress (e.g., Jackendoff, 2009; Kuhlmeier et al., 2003; Premack & 
Premack, 1995, 1997). The norm of welfare is violated by inflicting harm on another individual (i.e., an 
error of commission), or by ignoring another individual who is in distress and needs help (i.e., an error of 
omission). Some evidence indicates that infants, by their second year of life, may already possess 
expectations about how individuals should respond to others who are in distress (e.g., Johnson, Dweck, & 
Chen, 2007; Johnson, et al., 2010; Houston, et al., 2010). For example, when observing a computer-
animated scene involving a “caregiver” and a crying “child” (depicted by a large and a small oval, 
respectively), infants detect a violation if the caregiver ignores, rather than comforts, the distressed child 
(Johnson, et al., 2007). 
The norm of hierarchy states that dominant individuals have privileged influence and access to 
resources compared to subordinate ones. Dominance hierarchies are ubiquitous across cultures (e.g., Fiske, 
2000). A recent study (Thomsen et al., 2011) found that infants, by one year old, realize social dominance 
and understand that when two individuals' goals conflict, the one with larger relative size will prevail. 
Infants watched videos of interactions between a large and a small cartoon block, each depicted with eyes 
and a mouth. In the familiarization trials, either the large block bounced across a stage in one direction or 
the small block bounced across a stage in the opposite direction. Next, infants watched the two blocks 
meet in the middle, impeding one another's progress. They saw either the large block deferred the small 
one by bowing and stepping aside, or the small block deferred the large block by bowing and stepping 
aside. Infants aged 10 to 16 months looked significantly longer when the large block yielded to the 
smaller one than when the small one yielded to the large one. This and control results together suggest 
that infants already have some rudimentary understanding of social dominance and how it relates to 
relative size. 
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3. Present research 
3.1. Overview of present projects 
The present projects built on the previous findings and continued to examine socio-moral 
expectations in infants and toddlers. In particular, we asked whether children’s expectations about 
reciprocity would be modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty, and if so, then how. 
The first two projects were aimed at testing whether infants’ expectations of retaliation would be 
modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty.  
In Project 1, we tested the idea of “escalation” and asked whether infants would expect an 
individual to retaliate more severely against an outgroup member than against an ingroup member.  
In Project 2, we tested the idea of “co-retaliation” and asked whether infants would expect 
individuals to retaliate against an outgroup member who had previously hindered the individual’s group 
member. We also examined the continuity of early socio-moral expectations by testing “co-retaliation” in 
toddlers using similar methods. 
In Project 3, we started to investigate whether young children’s expectations of reciprocation 
would also be modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty. In particular, we tested the idea of 
“privilege” and asked whether toddlers would expect individuals to act more positively in response to a 
friendly overture by an ingroup member than by an outgroup member. 
To sum up, we explored whether infants and toddlers would have early expectations of socio-
moral norms. We reasoned that the findings of the present projects would help shed light on the origin of 
socio-moral expectations. Given that infants have very limited social experience besides the child-
caregiver interactions, we reasoned that positive findings in the present projects would support the early-
emergence view that children are born with a rich innate basis for understanding social interactions. 
3.2. Features of the research approach 
 Here are three key features of our experimental approach: we presented infants and toddlers with 
third-party situations involving novel artificial social groups and we examined their sensitivity to 
contextual factors of the situations. 
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3.2.1. Using novel artificial social groups 
The present projects used arbitrarily-defined social groups children had no prior exposure to. 
Most prior research has used socially-recognized groups, such as race, gender, nationality, religion, and 
language groups, which children may have exposure to in daily life. It would be difficult to disentangle 
whether children’s expectations about interactions among these socially-recognized groups is due to 
familiarity through experience or whether it is due to general experiences of how people should act within 
or across groups. By using novel artificial social groups, we could limit the effect of children’s experience 
of socially-recognized groups. 
 This feature allowed us to examine whether a mere categorical distinction, prior to any cultural 
elaboration, would have some consequences for children’s expectations about how individuals should 
interact with one another. The minimal-group paradigm was developed and used to study the origins of 
intergroup bias in adults (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Brewer, 1979; Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In the studies by Tajfel and his colleagues (e.g., Billig & Tajfel, 
1973; Tajfel et al., 1971), adult participants were grouped based on shared preferences (e.g., whether they 
prefer Klee’s or Kandinsky’s paintings) or even random assignment (e.g., participants were told whether 
they under- or over-estimated the number of dots in a dot estimation task). These seemingly meaningless 
social groupings were found to be sufficient to induce preference for the ingroup across a wide range of 
measures, including resource allocation (Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980; Tajfel & Turner, 2004), trait 
evaluations (Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980), as well as implicit measures designed to tap 
introspectively inaccessible associations in semantic memory (Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001; 
Otten & Wentura, 1999). 
In a series of studies by Bigler and colleagues (Bigler, Brown, & Markell, 2001; Bigler, Jones, & 
Lobliner, 1997; Patterson & Bigler, 2006), children were assigned to novel groups (e.g., blue- or. yellow-
shirt team) over the course of a 3 to 6 week summer program. The groups were used by teachers for 
different functions, for example, as a way of dividing the children up for activities. The results showed 
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that the intergroup categorization had significant effect on both preschool and elementary-school 
children’s social judgment regarding those novel groups. 
The present projects examined whether infants and toddlers would consider unfamiliar, 
arbitrarily-defined group markers, such as novel physical appearance or naming label, to be sufficient to 
establish group membership. If infants and toddlers are sensitive to novel markers for social groups and 
immediately have expectations about how individuals should act within or across groups, it would support 
the early-emergence view that children’s moral sense is either innate or learned quickly in infancy. 
3.2.2. Using third-party situations 
Most previous research on social groups has used first-party situations, where children choose to 
interact with either a member of their own group or one of another group. However, first-party situations 
may impair children’s moral reasoning because children’s self-interest is closed related to the outcomes of 
the situations. Here we used third-party situations. Instead of examining how infants and toddlers 
themselves act towards their ingroup and outgroup members, we asked a more basic question: when 
children observe individuals’ interactions as bystanders, what kinds of expectations do they have for these 
interactions within and across groups?  
In the present projects, children themselves did not benefit or incur harm from the possible 
outcomes of the situations; and they were also not affiliated with any of the social groups. Therefore, we 
minimized the involvement of children’s self-interests in the events that they were watching. Young 
children are generally poor at regulating their emotions or controlling their behaviors when their self 
interest is closely involved (e.g., Damon, 1975; Fehr et al., 2008; Piaget, 1932/1965). By placing children 
in the third-party role, they would be more likely to reason about how people should act in a general 
sense, rather than how they themselves would act in that situation. 
By using third-party situations, we measured infants and toddlers’ spontaneous non-verbal 
responses to the situations. Evidence that infants and toddlers reveal their moral sense in non-verbal 
measures would be important for one crucial methodological reason; it would broaden the assortment of 
experimental tools available for exploring early moral development. Prior research on moral judgments or 
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moral reasoning has relied heavily on participants’ verbal responses to complicated stories that often 
involve some sort of dilemma (such as the trolley dilemmas). Infants and toddlers are either unable to, or 
have minimal practice at articulating what they think is right or wrong. However, they are well-versed in 
exploring the world with their hands and eyes. Research using non-verbal tasks (e.g., measuring what 
children reach for, where they look, and how long they look) has already shown that infants come into the 
world equipped with a wealth of cognitive resources to support their reasoning about their surroundings. 
For example, infants prefer human faces (e.g. Fantz, 1958); infants can represent hidden objects (e.g. 
Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman, 1985); infants have some expectations about when an object will 
fall and when it will be stable (e.g. Baillargeon, Needham, & DeVos, 1992); infants can segregate objects 
based on objects’ featural differences (e.g. Xu, & Carey, 1996; Needham & Baillargeon, 2000); infants 
can infer the location of an object based on its height, width or other variables (e.g. Hespos & Baillargeon, 
2006); infants can understand that others may have and act on their beliefs, either true or false (e.g., 
Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; He, Bolz, & Baillargeon, 2011; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). Using 
similar non-verbal measures, the present projects aimed at exploring potential early socio-moral 
expectations. 
3.2.3. Exploring sensitivity to contextual factors 
Prior research has found that adults’ emotions and their consideration of contextual factors make 
independent contributions to moral judgments. For instance, victims of natural disasters often lead us to 
feel personal distress and concern, but do not lead us to judge that a moral transgression has occurred. 
Similarly, individuals respond affectively but without drawing any moral judgment when other people’s 
suffering is a result of an accident. Moral judgments are more often made when a person is suffering 
because of an unjust violation of socio-moral norms (Nichols, 2008). 
Here we examined young children’s sensitivity to contextual factors when generating socio-moral 
expectations, in other words, whether they can take into account not only the outcomes of actions, but 
also the contexts in which the actions occur. The present projects focused on three main types of 
contextual factors: (1) whether young children would consider the intergroup context (e.g., the individuals 
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belong to the same group or different groups); (2) whether young children would consider the prior 
history of interactions among the individuals (e.g., the presence of prior provocation, the previous actions 
targeted toward the individual’s ingroup members as well as those targeted toward the individual 
him/herself); (3) whether young children would attribute differentiated mental states to each member of a 
group (e.g., the individuals’ motivations and intentions; their knowledge and ignorance; and their false 
beliefs and pretense). 
Evidence for early sensitivity to these contextual factors would support the early-emergence view, 
and would be especially consistent with the principle-based approach, as opposed to the emotions-based 
approach. The emotion-based approach predicts that early moral expectations should be primarily 
triggered by external emotional stimuli, such as how violent actions are (a bottom-up process); in contrast, 
the principle-based approach argues that early moral expectations are influenced by internal moral 
principles that are applied based on particular contextual factors (a top-down process).  
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CHAPTER 2: PROJECT 1 ON ESCALATION  
Project 1 examines the origins of the norm of reciprocity, specifically the aspect of retaliation. 
Several key points regarding this phenomenon have already been established.  First, retaliatory behavior 
is evident in both human (e.g., Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Shinada, 
Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004) and non-human societies (Boyd et al., 2003; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; 
Clutton-Brock, Price, & MacColl, 1992; de Waal, 1982; Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Manson, 1994; 
Nadler & Miller, 1982; Smuts & Smuts, 1983).  
Second, retaliation is not rare within a social group. When a family member inflicts physical 
violence, when a partner commits adultery, or when a tribe member cheats in a social exchange, their bad 
behavior often evokes paybacks. People have a sense of satisfaction after extracting vengeance or getting 
even (e.g., Fry, 2006).  
Third, retaliation is also used as a way to regulate the interactions across groups. For example, 
among the tribes of the Upper Xingu River basin in Amazonia, there exists a regular intertribal ritual 
called a Yawari contest: two members from opposed tribes pair off, then hurl insults and subsequently 
wax-tipped spears at one another. All the spears are required to be tipped with wax and they are not 
allowed to be thrown above the waist. People have to control their aggressive impulse because the 
aggressors and their targets change roles in the ritual, which means if a person inflicts too much harm, he 
may find himself equally injured shortly (Gregor, 1994). 
While there is emerging evidence that even infants are aware of and appear to expect retaliation 
in certain situations (e.g., He, et al, under review), many factors are still unexplored.  It is unclear whether 
infants expect individuals to follow the norm of reciprocity in both the ingroup and the outgroup context, 
and if so, to what extent (magnitude).  
Some evidence suggested that the ingroup feature of friendship affects the quantitative aspect of 
reciprocity. For example, one observational study (Fujisawa, Kutsukake, & Hasegawa, 2010) recorded 
and analyzed reciprocal behaviors among 3- and 4-year-old Japanese preschool children during free-play 
time. The results show a tendency for positive reciprocity. Both friends and non-friends tended to 
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reciprocate the actions of those who had previously offered help compared to those who had not, but 
friends reciprocated object offerings more frequently than non-friends. However, it is unclear whether 
friendship would affect expectations about retaliation (i.e., negative reciprocity) in a similar manner. 
The properties of negative reciprocity have been explored in adults.  Some studies have examined 
whether relatedness to a perpetrator affects people’s willingness to punish the perpetrator (e.g., Boyd et 
al., 2003; O’ Gorman, Wilson, & Miller, 2005). The study by O’ Gorman et al. (2005) showed that 
participants assigned equivalent levels of punishment to a cousin, friend, and stranger who stole from a 
group account. The lack of significant differences among the perpetrators was not due to failure of 
manipulating the variable of relatedness; the same manipulation yielded significant results with helping 
behavior -- participants were more willing to provide assistance to cousins than strangers. While it seems 
that the participants would like to retaliate against ingroup members to a similar extent as against 
strangers, this may be specific to the “public goods” context used in this experiment.  This has been 
shown to follow different psychological principles compared to non-collective interactions (e.g., 
Lieberman & Linke, 2007).  In addition, how infants would react to such a situation has also not yet been 
investigated.  Given the early sensitivity to ingroup loyalty (e.g., Over & Carpenter, 2009), infants may 
expect a more severe retaliation against an outgroup member than against an ingroup member. 
Another intriguing question is whether children would expect any limit on the severity of 
retaliation against an outgroup member. This might be plausible for a number of reasons.  
(1) The severity of punishment for a misdeed or wrongdoing should be reasonable and 
proportional to the severity of the infraction, regardless of whether the target of the punishment is an 
ingroup or an outgroup member (e.g., Fry, 2006). The expressions of “an eye for an eye” and “a tooth for 
a tooth” reflect the balance of negative paybacks. A serious misdeed tends to elicit a greater payback than 
a minor breach of rules or social obligations (“let the punishment fit the crime”).  
(2)  The norm of “do no harm” (e.g. Premack, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007) may also limit an 
extremely severe retaliation against an outgroup member, even when escalation is expected. Any extreme 
retaliatory action, such as taking a life in exchange for a life, is generally disapproved. For example, one 
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study sampled 50 cultures and found the occurrence of lethal feuding to be as follows:  frequent in 16%; 
infrequent in 28%; and absent in the remaining 56% (Otterbein & Otterbein, 1965).  
(3) The boundaries among groups are dynamic and overlapping. People frequently trade goods 
and seek marriage across group lines. Today’s outgroup member could be your ingroup member 
tomorrow. Therefore, extreme retaliation may be abandoned because of the potential for merged or 
swapped group membership in the future. 
Based on the findings of these previous studies, we generated 3 hypotheses to investigate in 
Project 1: (1) Infants expect individuals to retaliate against ingroup as well as against outgroup members; 
(2) Infants expect individuals to retaliate more severely against outgroup than against ingroup members.  
In other words, infants expect an escalation of retaliation against outgroup compared to ingroup members; 
and (3) infants expect a limit on the severity of retaliation even against outgroup member. In summary, 
infants expect the norm of retaliation in both ingroup and outgroup contexts, and considerations of 
ingroup loyalty will modulate the magnitude, but not the valence of retaliatory behaviors. 
One point to take into account while exploring these ideas is that infants might expect more 
retaliation against outgroup members in part because of different set-points: if some degree of aggression 
toward outgroup members is tolerated without provocation, it would help explain why more aggressive 
reactions are expected with provocation. To address this issue, we included a no-provocation condition to 
examine whether children would view it as acceptable to inflict aggression on an ingroup or an outgroup 
member without provocation.  
In Project 1, infants were presented with two arbitrary social groups marked by contrasting outfits. 
This allowed us to examine whether young children would form social groups based on surface features 
of the individuals, such as their physical similarity. People tend to expect physically alike individuals to 
belong to the same groups and physically unlike ones belong to different groups. Prior research showed 
that children can categorize people into arbitrary social groups based on physical similarity. For example, 
in the experiments of Olson and her colleagues (Olson, Banaji, Dweck, & Spelke, 2006), children aged 3-
5 years showed a preference for lucky over unlucky people, and generalized this preference to the lucky 
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people’s ingroup members who wore T-shirts of the same color, despite the fact that the color groups 
were never explicitly mentioned. Therefore, we speculated that infants might be able to categorize people 
into groups based on salient physical similarities and differences. 
In Experiment 1, we tested whether infants would expect an individual to retaliate against an 
ingroup member, and compared between the magnitude of the negative action expected with and without 
provocation.  
In Experiment 2, we tested whether infants would expect an individual to retaliate against an 
outgroup member, and we again compared between the magnitude of the negative action expected with 
and without provocation. Of particular interest was whether infants would expect a more severe 
retaliation against an outgroup than an ingroup member. 
In Experiment 3, we tested whether infants would expect any limit on the severity of the 
retaliation allowed against an outgroup member. 
Experiment 1 
Prior experiments suggest that infants have an expectation of retaliation (e.g., He, et al, under 
review), but the group membership of the two individuals was not manipulated in these experiments. 
Experiment 1 tested (1) whether infants expect an individual to retaliate against an ingroup member, (2) 
whether the magnitude of the negative action expected following provocation is greater than that expected 
when no provocation has occurred. 
Infants watched one familiarization and one test trial (see figure 1). At the start of the 
familiarization trial, three individuals sat at an apparatus. A1, on the right, and B1, on the left, wore 
different outfits and thus belonged to different groups; the target individual (who retaliated against A1 in 
the test trial) sat in the middle and wore the same outfit as A1. In the familiarization trial, as B1 and the 
target individual looked on, A1 stacked small blocks and built two towers of four blocks each.  
In the test trial in the provocation situation, B1 was absent, and the target individual ate crackers 
as she watched A1 build a third tower of blocks. After A1 completed her tower, she stole one of the target 
individual’s crackers and left. In retaliation, the target individual knocked down either one block from one 
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tower (one-block event), or one or two towers (some-towers event); the target individual then paused until 
the trial ended. The test trial in the no-provocation situation was similar except that, after A1 completed 
her tower, she left without stealing the target individual’s cracker. 
We predicted that infants would expect the target individual to act more negatively toward her 
ingroup member when provoked than when unprovoked. 
Method 
Participants 
Our design called for 32 participants. Thus far, 28 healthy term infants (13 boys and 15 girls) 
have participated in this experiment (17 months, 9 day to 19 months, 23 days, M = 18 months, 21 days). 
Another 10 infants were tested but excluded, three because they were fussy (1), distracted (1), or active 
(1), and seven because they looked for maximum allowed in test. Sixteen infants were randomly assigned 
to the provocation (M = 19 months, 2 days) and the no-provocation (M = 18 months, 11 days) situations. 
In each situation, half the infants saw the one-block event, and half saw the some-towers event. 
Participants in this and the following experiments were recruited primarily from purchased 
mailing lists and from birth announcements in the local newspaper. Parents were offered reimbursement 
for their transportation expenses but were not compensated for their participation. 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus consisted of a brightly lit wooden display booth (124 cm high X 102 cm wide X 
56.5 cm deep) mounted 77 cm above the floor in a brightly lit test room. The infant sat on a parent’s lap 
and faced a large opening (46 cm X 95 cm wide) in the front of the apparatus; between trials, a curtain 
consisting of a muslin-covered wooden frame (59.5 cm X 101.5 cm) was lowered to hide this opening. 
Two large cloth-covered wooden frames (each 183 cm X 76 cm) stood at an angle on either side of the 
apparatus in order to isolate the infant from the test room. Inside the apparatus, the side walls were 
painted white, the back wall was made of white foam board, and the floor was covered with granite-
patterned contact paper.  
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Three female experimenters were involved in the events. A1 knelt at a window (51 cm X 38 cm) 
in the right wall of the apparatus, according to the infant’s perspective. This right window was located 4.5 
cm above the apparatus floor and 7.5 cm from the back wall. A1 wore a sleeveless orange giraffe-
patterned smock with a white long-sleeve shirt underneath. Her hair was tied back and she wore a blue hat 
decorated with white fringes along the center. B1 knelt at a window (50 cm X 37.5 cm) in the left wall of 
the apparatus. This left window was located 4.5 cm above the apparatus floor and 7.5 cm from the back 
wall. B1 wore a long-sleeve shirt made of brown fabric resembling bear fur with a black long-sleeve 
turtleneck underneath. Her hair was tied back and she wore a red knit cap with alternating green and 
yellow pompoms along the bottom. The target individual knelt at a window (50.5 cm X 54.5 cm) in the 
back wall of the apparatus. This back window extended from the apparatus floor and was located 24 cm 
from the right wall. The target individual wore the same kind of outfit as A1. White curtains behind the 
three experimenters hid the test room. 
During the familiarization trial, A1 brought in a green plastic woven basket (8 cm X 14 cm X 11 
cm at its largest points) containing 12 alphabet blocks (each 3 cm X 3 cm X 3 cm). Four blocks each were 
painted with a large blue letter D, four with a large yellow letter C, and four with a large red letter F. 
During the test trial, a plate (a black shallow plastic dish, 0.5 cm X 10 cm in diameter, located 2 
cm from the back wall and 44 cm from the right wall) of 20 Pepperidge Farm® Goldfish Crackers (0.5 
cm X 1.5 cm X 1.5 cm at its largest points) was positioned in front of the target individual.  
Trials 
In the following descriptions, the numbers in parentheses indicate the number of seconds taken to 
perform the actions described. To help the experimenters adhere to the events' scripts, a metronome beat 
softly once per second. A camera mounted behind and next to the infant captured an image of the events, 
and a second camera mounted beneath the apparatus floor captured an image of the infant; the two images 
were combined and projected onto a television set located behind the apparatus, and then recorded onto a 
computer. During the test session, the supervisor monitored the events on the TV set to confirm that they 
26 
 
followed the prescribed scripts. Recorded sessions were also checked offline to ensure that the correct 
actions were performed in each trial.  
During trials, the experimenters never made eye contact with the infant; they looked at the objects 
they acted on, followed each other’s actions, or (when no action occurred) looked at a neutral point on the 
apparatus floor. 
When a trial ended, a supervisor lowered the curtain at the front of the apparatus, and stimuli 
were readied for the next trial. Inter-trial intervals lasted about 15 s, and each new trial began with the 
raising of the curtain. 
Familiarization trial  
The familiarization trial served to familiarize the infant with A1’s block building activities, and it 
lasted 31 s. At the start of the trial, A1 sat at the right window and held the basket of alphabet blocks. 
After a pause (3 s), A1 placed the basket on the apparatus floor (located 2 cm from the back wall and 12 
cm from the right wall) and withdrew her hands to the window ledge (3 s). As B1 and the target 
individual looked on, A1 then stacked the four D-blocks into a tower with the letter Ds facing the child 
(12 s). Then A1 stacked the four C-blocks into a tower with the letter Cs again facing the child (12 s). 
After A1 reached into the basket for another block (1 s), the computer signaled the end of the trial and the 
supervisor lowered the curtain in front of the apparatus. 
Test trial  
The test trial consisted of an initial and a final phase. The initial phase lasted 27 s. B1 was absent 
(the left window was closed with an opaque white curtain). After a pause (3 s), the target individual 
started to eat crackers from a plate in front of her.  At the same time, A1 stacked the four F-blocks into a 
tower with the letter Fs facing the child, looking at the target individual and her crackers after each block 
was placed on the tower (12 s). After A1 placed the final block on the tower, she paused to admire the  
three towers (2 s).  
In the provocation situation, A1 then looked at the target individual’s crackers (2 s) and grabbed 
a cracker from the plate (1 s). The target individual then quickly covered her plate with both hands as A1 
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quickly stuffed the cracker into her mouth and started chewing it (1 s). Next, A1 left the apparatus by 
closing the side curtain (2 s). The no-provocation situation was similar except that, after A1 finished 
building her last tower, she left without taking the target individual’s cracker. Instead, A1 turned to the 
target individual and said, “Oh, I have to go. I will be back!” (4 s) before leaving by closing the curtain (2 
s).  
After A1 was gone, the target individual looked at A1’s towers (1 s). In the one-block event, the 
target individual knocked down the top block of the D-tower by a single push with her left hand; she then 
withdrew both hands on her laps, looked down at her crackers, and paused (3 s). In the some-towers 
event, the target individual knocked down the one tower (the D-tower) or two towers (the D- and the C-
tower) by a single push with her left hand and then withdrew her hands, looked down at her crackers, and 
paused (3 s). During the final phase, the infants watched the final paused scene until the computer 
signaled the end of the trial, and the supervisor lowered the curtain in front of the apparatus. 
Procedure 
Each infant sat on a parent’s lap centered about 45 cm in front of the apparatus. Parents were 
instructed to remain silent and neutral and to close their eyes during the test trial. Prior to the session, A 
and B briefly introduced themselves to the infant. 
Two naive observers monitored the infant’s looking behavior through peepholes in the cloth-
covered frames on either side of the apparatus. Each observer depressed a button linked to a computer 
when the infant looked at the events shown during a trial. Looking times during the initial and final 
phases of each trial were computed separately, using the primary observer’s responses. Interobserver 
agreement during the final phases of test trials was calculated for 25/28 infants (only one observer was 
present for the other infants) and averaged 98% per trial per infant. 
The infants were highly attentive during familiarization trial and looked for 30.9/31 s on average. 
Next, each infant watched a single test trial; half the infants saw the one-block event, and half 
saw the some-tower event. The infants were attentive and looked for 26.4/27 s on average during the 
initial phase. The final phase ended when the infant (1) looked away for 0.5 consecutive seconds after 
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having looked for at least 10 cumulative seconds, or (2) looked for 60 cumulative seconds without 
looking away for 0.5 consecutive seconds. 
Preliminary analyses of infants’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex with situation (provocation or no-provocation) and event (one-block or some-towers), 
Fs < 1; the data was therefore collapsed across sex in the final analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
 Infants’ looking times (see Figure 2) during the final phase of the test trial were compared by a 2 
X 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with situation (with or without provocation) and event (one-block or 
some-towers) as between-subjects factors. The main effect of situation was significant, F(1, 24) = 8.12, p 
< .01, ηp2 = 0.25. The main effect of event was not significant, F(1, 24) = 2.95, p = .10, ηp2 = 0.11. The 
interaction between situation and event was not significant, F(1, 24) = 2.87, p = .10, ηp2 = 0.11. Planned 
comparisons indicated that in the provocation situation, the infants who saw the some-towers event (M = 
29.6, SD = 3.3) looked longer than those who saw the one-block event (M = 20.6, SD = 8.4), F(1, 24) = 
5.36, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 1.41; however, in the no-provocation situation, the infants who saw the one-
block event (M = 32.6, SD = 6.2) and those who saw the some-towers event (M = 32.6, SD = 7.3) looked 
about equally long, F(1, 24) < 1. In addition, the planned contrast indicated that the looking times at the 
one-block event in the provocation situation were significantly different from those at the some-tower 
event in the provocation situation and those at the one-block and some-tower events in the no-provocation 
situation, F(1, 24) = 19.57, p < .05. 
 These results suggested that the infants viewed it as permissible to retaliate against an ingroup 
member with a mild negative act (i.e., knocking down a block) following provocation; however, more 
severe retaliation (i.e., knocking down some more towers) was unacceptable. Infants also viewed any 
unprovoked aggression on an ingroup member (no matter whether it was the one-block event or the some-
towers event) as unacceptable. 
Why do infants view it as permissible to retaliate against ingroup members? While it may seem 
contradictory to general group well-being, ingroup retaliation may be a strategy to promote cooperation 
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within groups (e.g. Boyd et al., 2003; Brock & Parker, 1995; Jesen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007). Without 
retaliation against non-cooperators, the welfare of the entire group may be compromised. Retaliation may 
decrease the likelihood of recurring harmful behaviors.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether infants would expect a retaliation against an outgroup 
member, as in Experiment 1; we compared the magnitude of the negative action expected with versus 
without provocation. Whether infants expect a more severe retaliation against an outgroup member than 
against an ingroup member was also examined. The infants were presented with similar events except that 
the target individual wore the same outfit as B1, marking that she belonged to B1’s group, rather than to 
A1’s group (see Figure 3). We predicted that infants would expect the target individual to (1) act more 
negatively toward an outgroup member when provoked than when unprovoked, and (2) retaliate more 
severely against an outgroup member compared to an ingroup member (in Experiment 1). 
Method 
Participants 
Our design called for 32 participants. Thus far, 29 healthy term infants (16 boys and 13 girls) 
have participated in this experiment (17 months, 7 day to 19 months, 26 days, M = 18 months, 21 days). 
Another 11 infants were tested but excluded, three because they were fussy (2) or distracted (1), three 
because the difference in their looking times during the test trial was over 2.5 standard deviations from 
the mean of their condition,  and five because they looked for maximum allowed in test. Half of the 
infants were randomly assigned to the provocation (M = 19 months, 2 days) and half to the no-
provocation (M = 18 months, 7 days) situation. In each situation, half the infants saw the one-block event, 
and half saw the some-towers event. 
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Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were the same as those in Experiment 1, except that the target 
individual and B1 both wore the bear-style outfit, while A1 wore the giraffe-style outfit, signaling that  
the target individual and A1 belonged to different groups.  
Trials 
 The familiarization and test trials were also the same as in Experiment 1 except for the 
aforementioned outfit changes. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to the one used in Experiment 1. The infants were highly attentive and 
looked for 30.7/31 s on average during the familiarization trial and for 26.9/27 s during the initial phase of 
the test trial. Interobserver agreement during the final phase of the test trial was calculated for 28/29 
infants (only one observer was present for the other infants) and averaged 99% per infant. 
Preliminary analyses of infants’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex with situation (provocation or no-provocation) and event (one-block or some-towers), 
Fs < 1; the data was therefore collapsed across sex in the final analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
 Infants’ looking times (see Figure 4) during the final phase of the test trial were compared by an 
ANOVA with situation (with or without provocation) and event (one-block or some-towers) as between-
subjects factors. The interaction between situation and event was significant, F (1, 25) = 19.8, p < .001, 
ηp2 = 0.44. Neither situation nor event had a significant main effect, Fs < 1. Planned comparisons 
indicated that in the no-provocation situation, the infants who saw the some-tower event (M = 35.0, SD = 
11.1) looked reliably longer than those who saw the one-block event (M = 20.1, SD = 5.6), F(1, 25) = 
8.42, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 1.51; in the provocation situation, the infants who saw the one-block event (M 
= 36.2, SD = 13.9) looked reliably longer than those who saw the some-towers event (M = 19.3, SD = 5.6), 
F(1, 25) = 11.56, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 1.59. 
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These results suggested that the infants viewed it as permissible to inflict a mild unprovoked 
aggression on an outgroup member (i.e., knocking down a block), while more severe aggression (i.e., 
knocking down some more towers), was unacceptable. However, following provocation, infants viewed it 
as acceptable to retaliate against an outgroup member with a moderate negative act (i.e., knocking down 
some more towers); but a mild retaliation (i.e., knocking down only one block) was viewed as not enough. 
The infants’ looking times in Experiments 1 and 2 were analyzed by an ANOVA, with condition 
(ingroup or outgroup), situation (with or without provocation), and event (one-block or some-towers) as 
three between-subject factors. The 3-way interaction was significant, F (1, 49) = 20.68, p < .001, ηp2 = 
0.30. Planned comparisons indicated that (1) in the no-provocation situation, the infants who saw the one-
block event in the ingroup condition looked reliably longer than those who saw the same event in the 
outgroup condition, F (1, 40) = 8.35, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.17, however, infants’ looking times at the some-
towers event were approximately the same in the ingroup and outgroup conditions, F (1, 40) < 1; (2) in 
the provocation situation, the infants who saw the one-block event in the outgroup condition looked 
reliably longer than those who saw the same event in the ingroup condition, F (1, 40) = 13.01, p < .05, ηp2 
= 0.25, however, the infants who saw the some-towers event in the ingroup condition looked reliably 
longer than those who saw the same event in the outgroup condition, F (1, 40) = 4.67, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.10. 
These results suggests that infants expect a more severe retaliation in the outgroup condition than 
in the ingroup condition: a mild retaliation is expected in the ingroup condition, whereas a moderate 
retaliation is expected and a mild retaliation is not enough in the outgroup condition. 
Why do infants expect individuals to retaliate against outgroup members more severely than 
against ingroup members? The norm of ingroup loyalty that individuals should act in ways to support 
their groups may dampen the retaliation against ingroup members. The main purpose of punishing non-
cooperative members is to make those group members more cooperative but not to harm them. Therefore, 
a relative escalation of retaliation is expected in the outgroup compared to the ingroup condition. 
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Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 examined whether infants expect any limit on the severity of retaliation against an 
outgroup member. The infants were presented with the all-towers events in which the target individual 
knocked down all three of A1’s towers after A1 stole and ate her cracker (see Figure 5). 
If the infants generally viewed knocking down all three towers as too severe a retaliation against 
someone who had stolen one of a plentiful plate of crackers, then the infants in the ingroup and the 
outgroup condition might all view the all-tower event as unexpected. 
Method 
Participants 
Our design called for 16 participants. Thus far, 12 healthy term infants, 7 male and 5 female (17 
months, 26 day to 19 months, 25 days, M = 18 months, 22 days) have been tested. Another infant was 
tested but excluded because she looked for the maximum allowed in the test trial. Half of the infants were 
randomly assigned to the ingroup and half to the outgroup condition.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were the same as those used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Trials 
Familiarization trial  
Infants in the ingroup condition saw the same familiarization trial as in Experiment 1, while those 
in the outgroup condition saw the same one as in Experiment 2. 
Test trial 
The test trial was similar to the one in the provocation situation of Experiments 1 and 2 except 
that the target individual knocked down all the three towers by a single push with left hand (all-towers 
event). 
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Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. The infants were highly attentive and 
looked for 30.6/31 s on average during the familiarization trial and for 27/27 s during the initial phase of 
the test trial. Interobserver agreement during the final phase of the test trial was calculated for 11/12 
infants (only one observer was present for the other infant) and averaged 94% per infant. 
Preliminary analyses of infants’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex with condition (ingroup or outgroup), F(1,8) < 1; the data was therefore collapsed 
across sex in the final analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
Infants’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial were compared by a t-test with 
condition (ingroup or outgroup) as a between-subjects factor. The children in the ingroup (M = 34.8, SD = 
13.6) and in the outgroup (M = 34.1, SD = 14.5) condition looked at the all-towers event about equally, t 
(10) < 1.  
In additional analyses, infants’ looking times at the all-towers events were contrasted to those of 
the infants in the provocation condition in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Figure 6). The infants’ looking times 
were analyzed by an ANOVA, with condition (ingroup or outgroup) and event (one-block, some-towers, 
or all-towers) as two between-subject factors. The interaction between condition and event was 
significant, F (2, 34) = 5.15, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.23. We first compared the looking times at the one-block, 
some-towers, and all-towers events of the infants in the ingroup condition. The planned contrast showed 
that the children who saw the all-towers and some-towers events looked reliably longer than those who 
saw the one-block event, F (1, 34) = 5.42, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.14. These results suggest that infants expect 
mild to moderate retaliation against an outgroup member, and that detect a violation if the retaliation 
become moderate to severe. Next, we compared the looking times at the one-block, some-towers, and all-
towers events of the infants in the outgroup condition. The planned contrast showed that the children who 
saw the one-block event and the all-towers event looked reliably longer than those who saw the some-
towers event, F(1, 34) = 16.76, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.33. These results suggest that infants expect a moderately-
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severe level of retaliation against an outgroup member, and that detect a violation if the retaliation is 
either too mild or too severe.  
Together, these findings suggest that infants expect more a severe retaliation against outgroup 
members, but that there is still a limit to the severity of the retaliation that is permissible against them. 
What limits the retaliation against outgroup members? There may be several possibilities. (1) If an 
individual retaliates against an outgroup member too severely, the overreaction may lead to a new cycle 
of retaliation by that outgroup member; (2) The welfare and fairness principles, which apply across 
groups, may contain retaliations across groups. For example, the principle of “do no harm” may limit how 
severely individuals act negatively toward outgroup members (e.g. Premack, 2008). Moreover, the 
principle of fairness may require the severity of punishment for a misdeed or wrongdoing to be reasonable 
and proportional to the severity of the infraction, regardless of whether the target of the punishment is an 
ingroup or an outgroup member. 
Discussion of Project 1 
Overall, the results of the three experiments in Project 1 suggest that 19-month-old infants (1) 
expect individuals to retaliate against both ingroup and outgroup members and (2) expect a more severe 
retaliation against outgroup than against ingroup members.  
As far as we know, Project 1 is the first to examine infants’ understanding of the magnitudes of 
actions in addition to their valence. The results suggest that infants, by 19 months of age, are already 
sensitive to the magnitude of retaliatory actions, and form different expectations when the two individuals 
belong to the same group or different groups. Future investigation is needed to examine whether the 
difference in magnitude of retaliation expected against outgroup versus ingroup members were due to 
amplified retaliation in the outgroup condition (related to an unmarked condition in which group 
membership is not indicated) or if it is due to dampened retaliation in the ingroup condition (related to the 
unmarked condition). 
The results of Project 1 also provide evidence on infants’ expectations about the valence of 
individuals’ initial (as opposed to reciprocal) actions. In our experiments, infants consider it permissible 
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to inflict a mild unprovoked aggression on an outgroup member, but unacceptable on an ingroup member. 
These findings are consistent with prior evidence on the early sensitivity of ingroup loyalty (e.g., Kinzler 
et al., 2007, 2011; Mahajan & Wynn, 2010; Over & Carpenter, 2009; Shutts et al., 2009; Werneken & 
Tomasello, 2006, 2007).  
How do infants attain their expectations about retaliation? One possibility is that reciprocity is 
one of a small set of innate norms guiding socio-moral reasoning (e.g., Dwyer, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 
2007; Premack, 2007). Another possibility is that infants identify retaliation as one of the norms that 
prevail in their daily social environment, and gradually extend it to new individuals and situations (e.g., 
Sripada & Stich, 2006; Turiel, 2006). In a preliminary analysis combining the data from the three 
experiments, we found no reliable difference in the test responses of infants with and without older 
siblings, nor did we find a reliable difference in the test responses of infants with and without substantial 
day care experience. This suggests that interactions with peers may not be necessary for an expectation of 
retaliation, and reciprocity more generally, to emerge. 
These early expectations about aggression and retaliation must help infants interpret the social 
interactions they observe daily and predict the consequences of their own actions toward others. These 
expectations may lay the foundation for the children to understand and deal with social conflicts in their 
relations with others. It is important to investigate in the future the effect of social environments on these 
early expectations, for example, whether and how these expectations would be modified when children 
live in an abusive, as opposed to a supportive, environment. 
In sum, the findings of Project 1 indicates that, by the second year of life, infants already possess 
expectations about retaliation and these expectations are modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty. 
Infants expect an escalation of retaliation in the outgroup condition compared to the ingroup condition. 
That is, infants expect a more severe retaliation against an outgroup member than against an ingroup 
member.  
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CHAPTER 3: PROJECT 2 ON CO-RETALIATION 
Project 1 focused on infants’ expectations about the interactions between A1 and the target 
individual (B1 was present in the familiarization trial only to make the group markers more salient). The 
results suggest that infants expect the target individual to act negatively in response to A1’s provocation, 
with a more severe magnitude when A1 is an outgroup member. This is an example of first-party 
punishment in which victims directly punish those who are responsible for causing them harm.  
One question that was not addressed is whether infants also hold expectations about third-party 
punishment. This occurs when punishment is enacted by someone who was not directly harmed by the 
actions of the individual who is being punished. Third-party punishment is critical for preventing social 
norms from being violated and for maintaining cooperation and positivity within a group. In human 
history, complex social organizations, such as government and police, have evolved so that some people 
are elected to take the responsibility of punishing group members who violate the interest of the group 
(Fry, 2006). Prior research on third-party punishment suggests that people are willing to punish non-
cooperators in their groups even when they themselves do not directly benefit from the punishment (e.g., 
Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2004; Gummerum et al., 2009).  
The idea of co-retaliation as proposed by David Premack expands on this idea of third-party 
retaliation by including the factors of ingroup and outgroup: Assuming B1 and B2 belong to the same 
group, and A1 belongs to a different group, if A1 hinders B1, then B2 should retaliate against A1 on 
behalf of B1 (Premack & Premack, 1995). 
Prior research suggests that belonging to the same group as the victim or the perpetrator of a 
moral transgression affects adults’ decision about the punishment assigned to the perpetrator. In one study, 
participants read scenarios describing a moral violation in which the victim of an offense was described as 
kin, a schoolmate, or a foreigner (Lieberman & Linke, 2007). Here is an example of one of the scenarios: 
a burglar broke into your family member’s home and stole some expensive property. Results showed that 
the participants wanted the burglar to serve the longest jail time or to pay the highest fine if the victim 
was their family member, followed by a schoolmate, and then a foreigner. The participants also reported a 
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greater willingness to sacrifice their time or money to punish a perpetrator who victimized their family 
member, again followed by a schoolmate, and then a foreigner. In addition, the allocated punishment was 
affected by whether the perpetrator was an ingroup or an outgroup member; family members received the 
least punishment and outgroup members received the greatest punishment. 
This co-retaliation may be an important manifestation of ingroup loyalty: people provide 
assistance and protection to ingroup members, and they co-retaliate against outgroup individuals who 
have acted negatively toward ingroup members. Understanding the norm of ingroup loyalty is critical for 
one’s survival: as we know from human history, people can be executed for treason after helping the 
enemies of their groups.  This norm is also found in groups of non-human primates.  For example, studies 
on reciprocal grooming behavior among chimpanzees found that chimpanzees tend to concentrate 
benevolent grooming behavior only on their core alliances.  Members outside of this core group were not 
treated equally (e.g. Watts, 2000). This indicates that group loyalty requires individuals to direct more 
prosocial behaviors to ingroup than outgroup members.   
Project 2 was aimed at exploring how children would respond if an individual helped or hindered 
an outgroup member who had previously hindered the first individual’s ingroup member (i.e., co-
retaliation). Such exploration could help expand the current understanding of children’s expectations of 
the interactions among ingroup and outgroup individuals.  The following questions were addressed. (1) 
What are children’s expectations about triadic interactions of individuals (as opposed to the dyadic 
interactions explored in Project 1)? (2) Do children keep track of prior interactions among individuals, 
and consider the history of their interactions when predicting and interpreting subsequent interactions 
among the individuals? (3) Do children expect third-party retaliation against an outgroup member who 
has acted negatively against an ingroup member? (4) Do children detect a violation when individuals 
betray their ingroup, by helping an outgroup member who has hindered an ingroup member? 
In Experiments 4 and 5, we examined whether infants would expect an individual to retaliate 
against an outgroup member on behalf of her ingroup member (i.e., the expectation of co-retaliation) 
when the group membership was marked by contrasting outfits (as in Experiments 1 through 3). In 
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Experiments 6 and 7, we examined whether toddlers would show the expectation of co-retaliation, when 
the group membership was marked only by novel naming labels. We reasoned that positive findings in 
both infants and toddlers would provide converging evidence for the expectation of co-retaliation and 
would also suggest the continuity of early socio-moral expectations prior to preschool years. 
Experiment 4 
The findings of Experiments 1 through 3 and a prior study (e.g., He et al., under review) suggest 
that if a first individual acts negatively toward another individual, infants expect the second individual to 
act negatively in response to the provocation. Here, we examined whether infants’ expectations of 
retaliation would be modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty. Experiment 4 included 3 conditions 
that depicted events involving members of two arbitrary social groups, A and B. Children first saw A1 act 
negatively toward B1. We asked whether infants would expect B2, a member of the same group as B1, to 
react negatively toward A1. Positive results would suggest that ingroup loyalty entails co-retaliation 
against outgroup individuals who have acted negatively toward ingroup members. 
In the outgroup condition, infants saw A1 act negatively towards B1.  Then the target individual, 
also a member of group B, was given an opportunity to either help or hinder A1 (see Figure 7). Infants 
watched four familiarization trials, one pretest trial, and one test trial. At the start of each familiarization 
trial, three individuals sat at an apparatus. A1, on the right, and B1, on the left, wore different outfits and 
thus belonged to different groups; the target individual (who acted either positively or negatively toward 
A1 in the test trial) sat in the middle and wore the same outfit as B1. In the first two familiarization trials, 
as A1 and the target individual looked on, B1 made a rattle by placing a marble inside a plastic egg and 
shaking it; in the next two trials, A1 stole B1’s marble and left. In test, B1 was absent, and A1 stacked 
rings on a pole to make a tower. After vainly attempting to reach for the final ring, which lay across the 
apparatus out of reach, A1 left.  B2 then either threw A1’s ring away presumably so that A1 could not 
finish her tower when she returned (hinder event) or made it accessible to A1 when she returned (help 
event). We predicted that the infants would expect the target individual to hinder rather than help A1, 
since she had previously hindered the B2’s ingroup member, B1.  
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Two alternative interpretations besides the expectation of co-retaliation were also taken into 
consideration in this experiment.  The first alternative interpretation is that infants might just expect the 
target individual, B2, to hinder anyone who had hindered regardless of whether they were an ingroup or 
an outgroup member. It is possible that infant have a general bias against antisocial individuals, no matter 
whether they are ingroup or outgroup members. For example, in the experiments of Hamlin, Wynn, and 
Bloom (2007), 6- and 10-month-old infants (1) preferred prosocial (helping) individuals to antisocial 
(hindering) individuals, (2) preferred prosocial to neutral individuals (who neither helped nor hindered), 
and (3) preferred neutral to antisocial individuals. Moreover, in the follow-up study (Hamlin, Wynn & 
Bloom, 2010), 3-month-olds showed an aversion to antisocial individuals--they preferred neutral to 
antisocial individuals, though they had no particular preference between neutral and prosocial individuals.  
To rule out this alternative interpretation, an ingroup condition was included (see Figure 8). The 
infants in the ingroup condition watched similar trials except that the target individual wore the same 
outfit as A1. We predicted that the infants would expect the target individual to help rather than hinder A1 
who belonged to the same group as the target individual, despite the fact that A1 had hindered an 
outgroup member. 
The other interpretation was that infants might just expect the target individual to hinder the 
outgroup member, regardless of whether they had hindered or not, due to a sort of generalized “outgroup” 
hatred. Prior research on social cognition in adults suggests that intergroup conflicts are in fact mostly 
driven by “ingroup love” rather than by “outgroup hatred”. “Outgroup hatred” is not likely a part of our 
human nature, but a byproduct of resource sharing and exchange that takes place within the boundaries of 
a group (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009).  
To rule out this alternative interpretation, an outgroup-no-provocation condition was included 
(see Figure 9). The infants in the outgroup-no-provocation condition received trials similar to the 
outgroup condition except that the infants did not received the familiarization trials that showed A1 
hindering B1. We predicted that the infants would not have particular expectations about whether the 
target individual should help or hinder the outgroup member in this no-provocation condition. 
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To sum up, the results of the outgroup, the ingroup, and the outgroup-no-provocation conditions 
together might provide evidence that infants, by 13 months, are already sensitive to novel social groups as 
arbitrarily marked by contrasting outfits and have an expectation of co-retaliation.  
Method 
Participants 
Our designed called for 48 participants. Thus far, 47 healthy term infants (24 male and 23 female) 
have been tested (12 months, 6 day to 14 months, 1 days, M = 13 months, 9 days). Another 10 infants 
were tested but excluded, six because they were either fussy (2), inattentive (2), active (1), or had a 
looking time that was over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of their condition in the test trial (1), 
and four because they looked for the maximum allowed in the test. Sixteen infants were randomly 
assigned to the outgroup (M = 13 months, 6 days) and ingroup (M = 13 months, 8 days) conditions, and 
fifteen to the outgroup-no-provocation (M = 13 months, 12 days) condition. In each condition, half the 
infants saw the hinder event, and half saw the help event. 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus was the same as in Experiments 1 through 3.  
Three female experimenters were involved in the events. A1 knelt at a curtained window in the 
right wall of the apparatus. A1 wore an orange hooded sweatshirt with the hood on and tied at the chin. 
Her hair was tied back and she also wore a pair of purple clear glasses. 
B1 knelt at the left window of the apparatus and wore a black long-sleeve turtleneck. Her hair 
was tied back and she wore a pair of black-and-orange plush tiger-like ears and a black-and-orange plush 
tiger-like collar around her neck.  
The target individual knelt at the back window in an outfit that depended on the condition. She 
wore the same outfit as B1 in the outgroup and the outgroup-no-provocation conditions, while she wore 
the same outfit as A1 in the ingroup condition. 
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At the beginning of the first two familiarization trials, the two halves of a plastic Easter egg (6 cm 
X 4.5 cm in diameter at its largest points) were separated and placed with their open ends down on the 
apparatus floor. The Easter egg was pink in the first trial and green in the second trial. One half was 
located 18 cm in front of the back window, and 6.5 cm from the left window; the other half was located 
33 cm in front of the back window, and 6.5 cm from the left window. A white placemat (0.5 cm X 8.5 cm 
X 8.5 cm) was placed on the apparatus floor 22.5 cm in front of the back window, and 24 cm from the left 
window. Centered on the placemat was a green marble (0.5 cm X 2 cm in diameter).  
The setup of the next two familiarization trials was the same as in the first two trials except that 
the placemat lay across the apparatus floor near A1, located 16 cm from the left window and 39 cm in 
front of the back window. The plastic Easter egg was yellow in the third trial and purple in the fourth trial. 
At the beginning of the pretest trial, the base of a stacking ring set (19 cm X 13 cm X 13 cm at its 
largest points) stood on the apparatus floor, located 29.5 cm in front of the back window and 2 cm from 
the left window. The base had a white bottom with a yellow tapered pole in its center. A white wooden 
tray (4 cm X 21 cm X 16.5 cm) was placed on the apparatus floor 2 cm in front of the back window and 2 
cm from the right window. The tray contained a stacking ring set that included, from largest to smallest, a 
blue, a green, a yellow and an orange ring. Each ring was placed against one edge of the tray. 
The setup for the test trial was the same as in the pretest except that the orange ring was not in the 
tray, but lay across the apparatus floor, about 6 cm from the left window and 22 cm in front of the back 
window. 
Trials 
Familiarization trials 
The first familiarization trial only had an initial phase, which lasted about 24 s. After a pause (2 
s), B1 made a rattle by placing the marble inside the cup (11 s) and shaking it while the target individual 
and A1 looked on (11 s). Next, the computer signaled the end of the trial, and the supervisor lowered the 
curtain in front of the apparatus. The second familiarization trial was identical to the first one except that 
the egg was replaced with one of a different color. 
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The third familiarization trial lasted about 34 s. The setup was the same as in the first two trials 
except that the placemat lay across the apparatus floor near A1. After a pause (2 s), B1 attempted but 
failed to reach for the marble while the target individual and A1 looked on (7 s). Then A1 took the marble 
away and left the apparatus by closing the curtain of the right window of the apparatus (6 s). B1 looked 
down and appeared unhappy (19 s). Next, the computer signaled the end of the trial, and the supervisor 
lowered the curtain in front of the apparatus. The fourth familiarization trial was identical to the third one 
except that the egg was replaced with one of a different color. 
Pretest trial 
The pretest trial only had an initial phase, which lasted 21 s. B1 was absent (the left window was 
completely closed with an opaque white curtain). After a pause (2 s), A1 stacked the blue, the green, the 
yellow, and then the orange ring on the pole as the target individual looked on (16 s). She withdrew her 
hand and looked at the stacking ring set pleasantly (3 s). Next, the computer signaled the end of the trial, 
and the supervisor lowered the curtain in front of the apparatus. The pretest trial served to make clear that 
A1 had a goal of stacking her rings and enjoyed accomplishing the goal. 
Test trial 
The test trial consisted of an initial and a final phase. The setup was the same as in the pretest 
except that the orange ring was not in the tray, but lay across the apparatus out of reach. The initial phase 
lasted for 29 s. B1 was absent. After a pause (2 s), A1 stacked the blue, the green, and then the yellow 
ring on the pole as the target individual looked on (12 s). Then A1 vainly attempted to reach for the 
orange ring, which lay across the apparatus floor (6 s). A1 left the apparatus by closing the curtain in the 
right window of the apparatus (2 s).  
In the hinder event, the target individual grasped the orange ring with her right hand (2 s) and 
threw the orange ring out of the apparatus (4 s). She then withdrew her hand to the apparatus floor, looked 
down at a neutral point, and paused (1 s).  
In the help event, the target individual grasped the orange ring with her right hand (2 s) and put it 
into A1’s tray (4 s). She then withdrew her hand, looked down at a neutral point, and paused (1 s).  
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During the final phase, the infants watched the final paused scene until the computer signal the 
end of the trial, and the supervisor lowered the curtain in front of the apparatus. 
Procedure 
The infants in the outgroup condition and those in the ingroup condition watched four 
familiarization trials, one pretest trial and one test trial. The infants in the outgroup-no-provocation 
condition watched only the first two familiarization trials, one pretest trial and one test trial; hence they 
never saw A1 hinder B1. 
The infants were highly attentive and looked for 23.9/24 s on average during the first two 
familiarization trials, 33.5/34 during the last two familiarization trials, 20.8/21 during the pretest trial, and 
28.9/29 s during the initial phase of the test trial.  
The final phase of test trial ended when the infant (1) looked away for 0.5 consecutive seconds 
after having looked for at least 10 cumulative seconds, or (2) looked for 40 cumulative seconds without 
looking away for 0.5 consecutive seconds. 
Interobserver agreement during the final phase of the test trial was calculated for 42/47 infants 
(only one observer was present for the other infants) and averaged 99% per infant. 
Preliminary analyses of infants’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex with condition (outgroup, ingroup, or outgroup-no-provocation) and event (help or 
hinder), F(2, 35) = 2.00, p > .05; the data was therefore collapsed across sex in the final analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
Infants’ looking times (see Figure 10) during the final phase of the test trial were compared by an 
ANOVA with condition (outgroup, ingroup, or outgroup no-provocation) and event (help or hinder) as 
between-subjects factors. The interaction between condition and event was significant, F(2, 41) = 9.54, p 
< .001, ηp2 = 0.32, but the main effects of condition and event were not significant,  Fs < 1.35, ps > .05. 
The planned comparisons revealed that children in the outgroup condition who saw the help event (M = 
23.6, SD = 8.2) looked reliably longer than those who saw the hinder event (M = 15.1, SD = 4.0), F(1, 41) 
= 7.71, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 1.32; children in the ingroup condition showed the reversed pattern: the 
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children who saw the hinder event (M = 24.7, SD = 8.7) looked reliably longer than those who saw the 
help event (M = 14.3, SD = 3.0), F(1, 41) = 11.54, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 1.60; in the outgroup-no-
provocation condition, the children who saw the hinder event (M = 16.6, SD = 5.6) and those who saw the 
help event (M = 15.9, SD = 5.0) looked about equally long,  F(1, 41) < 1, p >.05. 
In the outgroup condition, infants who saw the help event looked reliably longer than those who 
saw the hinder event. Thus, when A1 hindered B1 and then needed assistance to achieve her own goal, 
infants expected B2 to hinder A1, in co-retaliation for A1’s prior negative actions toward B1. 
By comparing the results of the outgroup condition to the ingroup condition and the outgroup-no-
provocation condition, we can rule out the two alternative interpretations. Infants in the outgroup 
condition expected the target individual to hinder A1, because they expected the target individual to 
hinder any hinderer, nor because they expected the target individual to hinder any outgroup member. The 
infants in the ingroup condition expected the target individual to help A1, irrespective of A1’s prior 
negative actions toward an outgroup member.  This expectation of assistance is consistent with the 
evidence that young children are more likely to provide assistance to an ingroup member or to a stranger 
when group affiliation is primed (e.g., Over & Carpenter, 2009; Werneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007) 
The infants in the outgroup-no-provocation condition had no particular expectation about whether 
the target individual should help or hinder A1 without provocation, suggesting that the infants clearly 
expected the target individual to hinder A1 only after A1 first hindered B1. This finding provides 
evidence supporting the claim that ingroup bias is rooted in “ingroup love” rather than in “outgroup 
hatred” (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009). 
The results of the three conditions together suggest that infants attend to group membership and 
expect individuals (1) to co-retaliate against outgroup individuals who have acted negatively toward 
ingroup members, but (2) to help ingroup members in need of assistance irrespective of whether they 
have acted negatively toward outgroup individuals. 
Experiment 4 provides evidence for early expectations of co-retaliation: infants expect an 
individual to retaliate against an outgroup individual on behalf of a group member. However, another two 
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alternative interpretations have been offered. First, expectations of co-retaliation could be attributed to 
infants’ own emotional responses to the provocation. If the infants sympathized with the victim of the 
provocation, they could have become upset and thus looked longer when they saw someone help the 
perpetrator of the provocation (sympathy hypothesis). 
Another alternative interpretation is that infants represent group members solely as tokens of the 
group, and that the tokens are identical and interchangeable. In other words, infants either are simply 
confused between different group members or they assume all group members share the same mental 
states (token hypothesis). Therefore, infants expected any group member to co-retaliate when any group 
member was provoked, and thus looked longer when they saw a group member help the perpetrator of the 
provocation. 
However, prior evidence suggests that infants are more capable than what the sympathy or the 
token hypothesis suggests. In particular, infants can attribute different mental states to different 
individuals (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2010; Johnson, 2000; Luo & Baillargeon, 2011). Therefore, it seemed 
more likely that infants could represent both the group memberships and the distinct mental states of the 
individuals in the events (mentalistic hypothesis). The mentalisitic hypothesis argues that infants can 
attribute differentiated mental states to each member of the group; they can make sense of intentional 
actions in terms of individuals’ goals, knowledge, and other mental states, even when those mental states 
are inconsistent with infants’ own mental states. Therefore, only the group members who know about the 
provocation targeted at another group member would be expected to co-retaliate. 
Experiment 5 
In the previous experiment, we hypothesized that infants would expect an individual to retaliate 
against an outgroup individual on behalf of another ingroup member. We reasoned that this behavior 
would be modulated by infants’ ingroup loyalty. While our hypothesis was confirmed, two alternative 
explanations do exist.  As detailed in the discussion section of Experiment 4, infants could be influenced 
by their emotional involvement in the scene that they witnessed (sympathy hypothesis), or they could be 
reacting to group members as identical and interchangeable tokens (token hypothesis).  We believe that a 
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third hypothesis, the mentalistic hypothesis compliments the reasoning we used in Experiment 4.  
Experiment 5 was designed to test the mentalistic hypothesis, while ruling out the sympathy and token 
hypotheses. 
Experiment 5 manipulated whether the provocation occurred during the target individual’s 
absence or presence. First, this manipulation would control for children’s emotional involvement in the 
scene. Children’s own emotion reactions should be equivalent whether the target individual was absent or 
present. Hence, the sympathy hypothesis predicted that the infants would expect the target individual to 
co-retaliate regardless of whether she was ignorant or knowledgeable about the provocation.  
Second, this manipulation would also examine whether children represented group member solely 
as interchangeable tokens. This token hypothesis argued that infants were simply confused between 
different group members or they assumed all group members share the same mental states. Hence, the 
token hypothesis, similar to the sympathy hypothesis, predicted that infants would expect any group 
member to co-retaliate regardless of whether she was ignorant or knowledgeable about the provocation. 
Therefore, three hypotheses were tested in Experiment 5. We asked whether the target 
individual’s knowledge about the provocation would affect infants’ expectation of co-retaliation. We 
proposed that infants would expect the target individual to co-retaliate only when she knew about the 
provocation.  
In the outgroup condition (see Figure 11), A1 acted negatively towards B1 in the absence or in 
the presence of the target individual, also a member of group B. Then the target individual helped A1. 
(Given the complementary nature of helping and hindering behaviors, we only included the help event in 
this experiment.) We predicted that (1) if the target individual was present during a provocation targeted 
at her ingroup member, then infants would consider it unacceptable for the target individual to help the 
outgroup perpetrator; but (2) if the target individual was absent during the provocation, then infants 
would consider it acceptable for the target individual to help the outgroup perpetrator. The first results 
would confirm the findings from the outgroup condition of Experiment 4 that infants expect individuals to 
co-retaliate against outgroup individuals who have acted negatively toward ingroup members; whereas 
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the second results would confirm the findings from the outgroup-no-provocation condition of Experiment 
4 that infants have no particular expectations whether individuals should help or hinder outgroup 
members without provocation. 
In the ingroup condition (see Figure 12), the target individual was portrayed as an ingroup 
member of perpetrator A1. We predicted that infants would consider it acceptable for the target individual 
to help her ingroup member A1 regardless of whether the target individual was present or absent when 
A1 hindered the outgroup member, B1. 
In other words, we predicted that in the outgroup condition, infants who saw the help event in the 
presence situation should look reliably longer than those who saw the help event in the absence situation. 
In the ingroup condition, infants who saw the help in the presence situation and those who saw the help 
event in the absence situation would look about equally long.  
Method 
Participants 
Our designed called for 32 participants. Thus far, 31 healthy term infants (16 male and 15 female) 
have been tested (13 months, 2 day to 14 months, 12 days, M = 13 months, 22 days). Another 6 infants 
were tested but excluded, three because they were fussy (1) or had a looking time that was over 2.5 
standard deviations from the mean of their condition in the test trial (2), and three because they looked for 
the maximum allowed in the test trial. Eight infants were randomly assigned to the outgroup (M = 13 
months, 21 days) and the ingroup (M = 13 months, 22 days) conditions. In each condition, half the infants 
saw that the target individual leave the apparatus before the provocation occurred (absence situation) and 
half saw that she leave after the provocation occurred (presence situation). 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 4.  
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Trials 
Familiarization trials  
The first two familiarization trials were identical to those used in Experiment 4. 
The last two familiarization trials were similar to those in Experiment 4 except that the target 
individual left either before or after the provocation (see the detailed descriptions of the actions below). 
The initial phase lasted 38 s for both condition.  
In the absence situation, after a pause (2 s), the target individual left the apparatus by closing the 
doors of the back window (4 s). As A1 looked on, B1 vainly attempted to reach for the marble (7 s). A1 
took the marble and left the apparatus by closing the right window curtain of the apparatus (6 s). B1 
looked down and appeared unhappy (19 s).  
In the presence situation, after a pause (2 s), B1 attempted but failed to reach for the marble while 
the target individual and A1 looked on (7 s). A1 took the marble and left the apparatus by closing the 
right window curtain of the apparatus (6 s). B1 looked down and appeared unhappy (19 s). Then the target 
individual left the apparatus by closing the doors of the back window (4 s).  
Pretest trial  
The pretest trial was identical to that in Experiment 4. 
Test trial 
The test trial was identical to the help event test trial in Experiment 4.  
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 4. 
The infants were highly attentive and looked for 23.9/24 s on average during the first two 
familiarization trials, 37.1/38 during the last two familiarization trials, 20.9/21 during the pretest trial and 
28.9/29 s during the initial phase of the test trial.  
The final phase of the test trial ended when the infant (1) looked away for 0.5 consecutive 
seconds after having looked for at least 10 cumulative seconds, or (2) looked for 40 cumulative seconds 
without looking away for 0.5 consecutive seconds. 
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Interobserver agreement during the final phase of the test trial was calculated for 23/31 infants 
(only one observer was present for the other infants) and averaged 97% per infant.   
Preliminary analyses of infants’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex with condition (outgroup or ingroup) and situation (presence or absence), F(1, 23) = 
1.12, p > .05; the data was therefore collapsed across sex in the final analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
Infants’ looking times (see Figure 13) during the final phase of the test trial were compared by an 
ANOVA with condition (outgroup or ingroup) and situation (presence or absence) as between-subjects 
factors. The interaction between condition and situation was significant was significant, F(1, 27) = 4.54, p 
< .05, ηp2 = 0.14; the main effect of situation was also significant, F(1, 27) = 6.04, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.18; the 
main effect of condition was not significant, F(1, 27) = 2.13, p > .05, ηp2 = 0.07. Planned comparisons 
revealed that in the outgroup condition, the infants who saw the help event in the presence situation (M = 
25.7, SD = 6.8) looked reliably longer than those who saw the help event in the absence situation (M = 
15.6, SD = 5.0), F(1, 27) = 10.1, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 1.69. The looking time of the infants in the ingroup 
condition who saw the help event in the presence situation (M = 17.8, SD = 6.4) and those who saw the 
help event in the absence situation (M = 17.0, SD = 6.0) were not significantly different,  F(1, 27) < 1. 
Therefore, the infants expected the target individual to co-retaliate against the outgroup individual 
on behalf of her ingroup member when the target individual herself had witnessed the provocation but not 
when she was absent during the provocation. The infants expected the target individual to help her 
ingroup member irrespective of whether she had witnessed the ingroup member act negatively toward the 
outgroup individual. 
These results together provide evidence for the mentalistic hypothesis. That is, infants can 
attribute differentiated mental states to each member of the group, and hence expect only those who have 
witnessed the provocation on other group members to retaliate against the perpetrator.  
These findings of Experiment 5 rule out the token hypothesis. Infants’ expectation of co-
retaliation is not due to infants’ confusion of members of a group. Infants can take into account the 
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knowledge or ignorance of each group member when they generate expectations about those members’ 
actions. Therefore, infants do not represent members of a group as identical or interchangeable tokens of 
the group. 
These findings also rule out the sympathy hypothesis. Infants’ expectation of co-retaliation is not 
due to infants’ sympathy with the victim of the provocation: had this been the case, infants’ emotional 
response to the provocation would have consistent whether or not the target individual was present during 
the provocation. However, infants expected the target individual to co-retaliate against the outgroup 
perpetrator only if she had seen the provocation.  
To sum up, the results of experiments 4 and 5 suggest that by 13 months, infants already attend to 
individuals’ group membership, hold different expectations for ingroup and outgroup members, and 
expect group members to protect one another through co-retaliation. 
Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 was aimed at examining whether 2.5-year-old toddlers would also have an 
expectation of co-retaliation. We reasoned that positive findings in both infants and toddlers would 
provide converging evidence for the expectation of co-retaliation and would also support the continuity of 
early socio-moral expectations in the first three years of life.  
We also wanted to explore what young children would consider to be sufficient group markers.  
Specifically, we wanted to test whether young children would form social groups based on novel verbal 
labels. 
Prior research shows that labeling plays an important role in children’s object categorization. For 
example, in a modified novelty-preference paradigm (Waxman & Markow, 1995), 12- to 13-month-old 
children formed a cat category after hearing the experimenter referred to different toy cats with the same 
label (e.g. “Look, a cat!”). This labeling effect persisted even when the experimenter used a less familiar 
noun, such as “See, a feline.” 
Social labels may also play a role in preschoolers’ social categorization. For example, in a series 
of studies by Bigler and her colleague (1995, 1997, 2006), children as young as 3 years showed an 
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ingroup bias when groups were formed based on the color of their shirts. The children were asked to each 
wear either a blue or a red T-shirt. For three weeks, the teachers routinely used the group labels (i.e., the 
“blue team” or the “red team”) when asking children to perform tasks. By the end of the three weeks, the 
children showed consistent bias favoring their own group. 
Gordon Allport’s Nature of Prejudice refers to some labels of social categories as “exceedingly 
salient and powerful. They tend to prevent alternative classification, or even cross-classification.” Some 
social labels “act like shrieking sirens, deafening us to all finer discriminations that we might otherwise 
perceive.” (Allport, 1954, p.179). The extraordinary power of our labels for social categories may be due 
to the fact that we tend to treat social categories as natural kinds rather than artificial kinds. Although 
social categories are in reality more like artifacts than natural kinds, social categories are often perceived 
as more like natural kinds than artifacts. This common misconception is probably because social 
categories are often believed to possess underlying essences that make one social category different from 
another (e.g. Haslam et al., 2000; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992).  
Studies have also shown the effect of social labels on infants’ social categorization. For example, 
in an unpublished experiment by Waxman, infants were first presented with an example of a novel social 
category – all the exemplars were labeled with a nonsense noun (e.g.,“a gorp”). Then the infants were 
introduced to a feature of the exemplar, which was also labeled with the nonsense word (e.g., He likes 
eating “blicket”). The results show that infants generalized the feature of the exemplar to other members 
of the social category (e.g., the infants expected that other “gorps” also liked eating “blicket”). These 
findings suggested children can form social categories based on novel naming labels. Also, the labeling 
effect may vary when using different grammatical forms of words. For example, children by 5 years of 
age expect a feature of a social category to be stable and enduring when the feature is referred to as a 
noun, such as “She is a carrot-eater,” but not when it is referred to as a verbal predicate, such as “She eats 
carrots whenever she can” (Gelman & Heyman, 1999). 
In Experiment 6, we examined whether toddlers would be sensitive to social groups marked by 
novel naming labels.  We used the novel naming labels “I am a boga!” and “I am a maloo!” as artificial 
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group markers.  Furthermore, we examined whether toddlers would expect individuals with the same 
label to protect each other through co-retaliation. 
Toddlers in the outgroup condition first watch two familiarization events (see Figures 14 & 15). 
At the start of each familiarization trial, three individuals sat at an apparatus: A1, on the right, B1, on the 
left, and the target individual. The target individual and B1 belonged to the same group while A1 
belonged to another group. Group membership was identified by naming labels. A1 first announced, “I 
am a jaybo!” Then the target individual said, “I am a topid!” Then B1 said, “I am topid, too!” The labels 
were repeated twice, with order counterbalanced across toddlers. In the first familiarization trial, after the 
labeling, B1 made a rattle by placing a block inside a plastic cup and shaking it, as A1 and the target 
individual looked on. In the second familiarization event, after the labeling, A1 stole B1’s block, so that 
B1 could no longer make her rattle. 
The toddlers then watched a single test trial: B1 was absent; A1 now was working on a puzzle as 
the target individual looked on. All the pieces except one were in a tray in front of her. The last piece lay 
across the apparatus floor, out of her reach (but within reach of the target individual). She put all the 
pieces on the tray in a puzzle board. She then attempted but failed to reach for the last puzzle piece. Next, 
A1 left and closed the curtain behind her. After A1 was gone, the target individual either threw the last 
puzzle piece out of the apparatus presumably so that A1 could not finish her puzzle when she returned 
(hinder event), or she put it in A1’s tray (help event). 
As in Experiment 4, an Ingroup condition (see Figures 16 & 17) and an outgroup-no-provocation 
condition (see Figures 18) were also included in this experiment. The ingroup condition was used to 
control for the fact that toddlers might just expect the target individual to hinder anyone whom they had 
witnessed hindering others, regardless of their group status.  The outgroup-no-provocation condition was 
included to control for the fact that toddlers might expect the target individual to hinder any outgroup 
member. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 48 healthy toddlers (23 male and 25 female) from English speaking families (27 
months, 22 day to 31 months, 10 days, M = 29 months, 10 days). Another 7 toddlers were tested but 
excluded, two because they were either drowsy (1) or distracted (1), and five because they had a looking 
time that was over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of their condition in the test trial. Sixteen 
toddlers were randomly assigned to the outgroup condition (M = 29 months, 15 days), the ingroup 
condition (M = 29 months, 6 days), and the outgroup-no-provocation (M = 29 months, 6 days) condition. 
In each condition, half the toddlers saw the help event, and half saw the hinder event. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus was similar to the one used in Experiments 1-5, but the parameters were slightly 
different. The apparatus consisted of a wooden display booth (127.5 cm high X 101 cm wide X 73.5 cm 
deep) mounted 76 cm above the floor of a brightly lit test room. The child sat on a parent’s lap and faced 
a large opening (44 cm X 93.5 cm) in the front of the apparatus; between trials, a muslin-covered frame 
(61 cm X 99.5 cm) was lowered to hide this opening. The back and side walls of the apparatus were 
painted white; the floor extended 11.5 cm behind the back wall and was covered with granite-patterned 
contact paper. Two wooden frames, each 192 cm high, 69 cm wide, and covered with white cloth, stood 
at an angle on either side of the apparatus; these frames served to isolate the child from the testing room 
and to hide the observers sitting behind them. 
Three female native speakers of English were involved in the events. A1 wore a grey shirt and 
knelt at the right window; B1 wore a maroon shirt and knelt at the left window; the target individual wore 
a brown and beige shirt and sat at the back window. 
Stimuli 
At the beginning of the first familiarization trial, a transparent pink plastic cup (10.5 cm X 8.5 cm 
in diameter at its largest points) was placed upside down on the apparatus floor 20 cm in front of the back 
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window and 7 cm from the left window. The cup had a transparent green plastic lid (0.5 cm X 9 cm in 
diameter) which was placed on the apparatus floor 37 cm in front of the back window and 7 cm from the 
left window. A grey granite-patterned placemat (0.5 cm X 10.5 cm X 10.5 cm) was placed on the 
apparatus floor 34.5 cm in front of the back window and 24 cm from the left window. Centered on the 
placemat was a wooden cube (2 cm X 2 cm X 2 cm) covered with solid green contact paper. 
At the beginning of the second familiarization trial, a transparent orange plastic cup (10.5 cm X 
8.5 cm in diameter at its largest points) was placed upside down on the apparatus floor 20 cm in front of 
the back window and 7 cm from the left window. The cup had a transparent yellow plastic lid (0.5 cm X 9 
cm in diameter) placed on the apparatus floor 37 cm in front of the back window and 7 cm from the left 
window. A grey granite-patterned placemat (0.5 cm X 10.5 cm X 10.5 cm) was placed on the apparatus 
floor 34.5 cm in front of the back window and 68 cm from the left window. Centered on the placemat was 
a wooden cube (2 cm X 2 cm X 2 cm) covered with solid blue contact paper. 
At the beginning of the test trial, a puzzle board (1 cm X 30 cm X 30 cm at its largest points) was 
placed on the apparatus floor 2 cm in front of the back window and 2 cm from the right window. In total, 
5 puzzle pieces of different sizes and colors could fit into the puzzle board. A metal tray (1 cm X 25 cm X 
20 cm) covered with blue contact paper was placed on the apparatus floor 34 cm in front of the back 
window and 1 cm from the right window. In the tray was a yellow square, an orange circle, a red 
rectangle and a blue triangle puzzle piece. A green oval puzzle piece was placed on the apparatus floor 20 
cm in front of the back window and 7 cm from the left window, out of A1’s reach. 
Trials 
Familiarization trials 
 In the outgroup condition, the first familiarization trial only had an initial phase, which lasted 42 
s. After a pause (2 s), A1 announced, “I’m a jaybo.” (2 s); after a 1-s pause, the target individual 
announced, “I’m a topid.” (2 s); then after a 1-s pause, B1 announced, “I’m a topid, too.” (2 s) The labels 
were repeated twice. The order of labeling was counterbalanced across participants (half of the children 
saw the labeling start from the A1, and half saw the labeling start from the B1). After the labeling 
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segment, B1 made a rattle by placing the block inside a cup (11 s) and shaking it (11 s) while A1 and the 
target individual looked on.  
The initial phase of the second trial thus lasted 54 s and was similar to the first familiarization 
trial except that the placemat lay across the apparatus floor near A1. Therefore, after the labeling, B1 
attempted but failed to reach for the block (9 s). Then A1 took the block away and left the apparatus by 
closing the curtain behind her (6 s).  B1 looked down and appeared unhappy (19 s).  
In the ingroup condition, the two familiarization trials were similar to those in the outgroup 
condition except that at the beginning of each familiarization trial, A1 first announced, “I’m a jaybo.” (2 
s); after a 1-s pause, the target individual announced, “I’m a jaybo, too.” (2 s); then after a 1-s pause, B1 
announced, “I’m a topid.” (2 s) 
In the outgroup-no-provocation condition, the two familiarization trials were similar to those in 
the outgroup condition, except each trial ended after A1, the target individual and B1 had each labeled 
themselves twice and thus lasted 20 s. 
Test event 
The test trial consisted of an initial and a final phase. The initial phase lasted for 29 s. B1 was 
absent (the left window was completely closed with an opaque white curtain), while A1 and the target 
individual were present. After a pause (2 s), A1 put all the puzzle pieces into the puzzle board except for 
one piece (12 s). She vainly attempted to reach for the last puzzle piece which lay across the apparatus out 
of reach (6 s). Then A1 left the apparatus by closing the curtain behind her (2 s). After A1 was gone, the 
target individual looked at the last puzzle piece (2 s). In the help event, the target individual put the last 
puzzle piece in A1’s tray with her right hand (4 s). She then withdrew her hand on the apparatus floor, 
looked at a neutral point, and paused (1 s). In the hinder event, the target individual threw the last puzzle 
piece out of the apparatus with her right hand (4 s). She then withdrew her hand on the apparatus floor, 
looked at a neutral point, and paused (1 s). During the final phase of the test trial, the toddlers watched 
this paused scene until the computer signaled the end of the trial. When this occurred, the supervisor 
lowered the curtain in front of the apparatus.  
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Procedure 
The toddlers in the outgroup and the ingroup conditions were highly attentive and looked for 
41.1/42 s on average in the first familiarization trial and for 52.6/54 s in the second familiarization trial. 
The toddlers in outgroup-no-provocation condition were also highly attentive and looked for 19.7/20 s on 
average in the first familiarization trial and for 19.7/20 s in the second familiarization trial. 
Next, each toddler watched a single test trial in each condition, half the toddlers saw the help 
event, and half saw the hinder event. The toddlers in the three conditions were highly attentive during the 
initial phase of the test trial and looked for 28.6/29 s on average. The final phase ended when the toddler 
(1) looked away for 0.5 consecutive seconds after having looked for at least 10 cumulative seconds, or (2) 
looked for 60 cumulative seconds without looking away for 0.5 consecutive seconds. 
The primary observer was absent from the test room during the familiarization trials and so did 
not know whether the toddler was assigned to the outgroup, the ingroup, or the outgroup-no-provocation 
condition. Interobserver agreement during the final phase of the test trial was calculated for 45/48 toddlers 
(only one observer was present for the other toddlers) and averaged 91% per toddler. 
Preliminary analyses of toddlers’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex and order of labeling (whether the labeling started from A1 or B1) with condition 
(outgroup, ingroup, or outgroup-no-provocation) and event (help or hinder), Fs < 1.69, ps > .05; the data 
was therefore collapsed across sex in the final analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
Toddlers’ looking times (see Figure 19) during the final phase of the test trial were compared by 
an ANOVA with condition (outgroup, ingroup, or outgroup no-provocation) and event (help or hinder) as 
between-subjects factors. The interaction between condition and event was significant, F(2, 42) = 10.52, p 
< .001, ηp2 = 0.33, but the main effects of condition and event were not,  Fs < 1.09, ps > .05. Planned 
comparisons revealed that in the outgroup condition, the children who saw the help event (M = 27.0, SD = 
9.1) looked reliably longer than those who saw the hinder event (M = 14.1, SD = 4.7), F(1, 42) = 9.13, p < 
.05, Cohen’s d = 1.78; in the ingroup condition, the reversed pattern was found: the children who saw the 
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hinder event (M = 24.9, SD = 10.0) looked reliably longer than those who saw the help event (M = 10.4, 
SD = 2.7), F(1, 42) = 11.53, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 1.98; in the outgroup-no-provocation condition, the 
children who saw the hinder (M = 18.1, SD = 14.4) and those who saw the help (M = 14.2, SD = 4.2) 
event  looked about equally,  F(1, 42) < 1. 
These results are consistent with those found in Experiment 4, and as such provide converging 
evidence for an early expectation of co-retaliation. Similar to the infants, the toddlers in the outgroup 
condition expected the target individual to hinder A1, who has previously hindered the target individual’s 
ingroup member, not because the toddlers expected the target individual to hinder anyone who has 
hindered, nor because the toddlers expected the target individual to hinder any outgroup member.  
Rather, both infants and toddlers appear to attend to group membership and expect individuals (1) 
to co-retaliate against outgroup individuals who have acted negatively toward ingroup members, and also 
(2) to help ingroup members in need of assistance irrespective of whether they have acted negatively 
toward outgroup individuals. These expectations are not specific for a particular type of social group, but 
are probably general expectations about how individuals should act among social groups, including those 
that are arbitrarily marked by physical similarities or by labels. 
These findings point to a consistent and continuous picture of early socio-moral understanding. 
Even before entering preschool, which marks the beginning of a typical period of intense peer interactions, 
infants and toddlers already have rich expectations about how individuals should interact within and 
across social groups. They expect individuals to protect group members through co-retaliation and to 
provide group members with assistance when needed. These expectations emerge in infancy and are 
maintained into toddlerhood.  
Experiment 7 
In the outgroup condition of Experiments 4 through 6, the children expected the target individual 
to hinder when the victim of the provocation was her ingroup member and to help when the perpetrator of 
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the provocation was her ingroup member. But what if the offender and the victim were both ingroup 
members of the target individual? Would the children expect the target individual to hinder or help? 
In Experiment 7, we tested toddlers in an all-ingroup condition in which all three experimenters 
shared the same naming label (see Figures 20 & 21). The target individual was then faced with a dilemma: 
should she provide assistance to an ingroup member who had hindered another ingroup member? Or 
would she betray her ingroup loyalty by helping someone who had acted negatively toward the other 
ingroup member? We predicted that toddlers expect the target individual to hinder rather than help her 
ingroup member A1, who had hindered another ingroup member. As previously mentioned, the third-
party punishment that can be enacted in this situation is critical for promoting prosocial behavior within 
groups, and for preventing the violation of social norms.  
Prior research on third-party punishment suggests that people are willing to punish non-
cooperators in their groups even when they themselves do not directly benefit from the punishment.  For 
example, in a study by Gummerum and colleagues (2009), adults’ and children’ tendencies to punish non-
cooperators were measured in a third-party punishment game, in which players could pay money from 
their own initial endowment to punish another anonymous unfair player. All participants were presented 
with an unfair scenario: the “proposer” allocated 18 of 20 Euros for him/herself, and left only 2 Euros for 
the “responder” in a dictator game. Participants began with an initial personal endowment of 10 Euros. 
Participants could pay any amount from 0 to 10 Euros, and this sum would be subtracted from their 
endowment. However, twice that amount would be subtracted from the payoff of the “proposer”. In the 
ingroup condition, the “proposer”, the “responder” and the participant all belonged to the same group 
(marked by their estimation in the dot estimation task). In the outgroup condition, the “proposer” and the 
“responder” belonged to the same group, but the participant belonged to a different group. The results 
showed that adults’ punishment for the unfair “proposer” was more than twice as high on average in the 
ingroup than in the outgroup condition. Similarly, sixth-graders tended to punish the unfair “proposer” 
more severely when they came from the ingroup than from the outgroup. Therefore, these results suggest 
that when a moral transgression occurs within their own groups (i.e., both the victim and the perpetrator 
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of the transgression are ingroup members), adults and elementary-school children are willing to enact 
third-party punishment even at their own cost; however, when both the victim and the perpetrator are 
outgroup members, they are less likely to scarify their personal interest to punish the perpetrator. 
Because this third-party punishment game entails not only the difficulties of understanding and 
remembering complicated game rules and also the conflicts of self interest, it is probably hard to adopt 
this task to test younger children’s tendency to seek justice within their own group. However, younger 
children may also reveal their expectations about third-party punishment in simpler situations. In 
Experiment 7, toddlers observed, as bystanders, simple interactions among three members of a group, and 
their expectations about the interactions were measured by their looking times. These features of our task 
could reduce the information-processing load on toddlers, which might make them more likely to succeed 
at our task.  
We predicted that the toddlers in Experiment 7 would show an expectation of third-party 
punishment within groups and thus would expect the target individual to hinder rather than help her 
ingroup member A1, who had hindered another ingroup member. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 16 healthy toddlers from English speaking families, 8 male and 8 female (28 
months, 14 day to 36 months, 11 days, M = 30 months, 10 days). Another toddler was tested but excluded 
because he had a looking time that was over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of his condition in the 
test trial. Half the toddlers saw the help event, and half saw the hinder event. 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and the stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 6. 
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Trials 
Familiarization trials. 
In the all-ingroup condition, the two familiarization trials were similar to those in the ingroup 
condition of Experiment 8, except that at the beginning of each familiarization trial, A1, on the right, first 
announced, “I’m a jaybo!” (2 s). After a 1-s pause, A2 (i.e., the target individual), in the middle, 
announced, “I’m a jaybo, too!” (2 s). After a 1-s pause, the A3, on the left, announced, “I’m a jaybo, too!” 
(2 s). The labels were repeated twice in each familiarization trial and the order of labeling was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Test event. 
The test trial was identical to the one in Experiment 6. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 6. The toddlers were highly attentive and looked 
for 41.4/42 s on average in the first familiarization trial and for 53.6/54 s in the second familiarization 
trial. The toddlers were also attentive during the initial phase of the test trial and looked for 29/29 s on 
average.  
Interobserver agreement during the final phase of the test trial was calculated for 15/16 toddlers 
(only one observer was present for the other toddler) and averaged 95% per toddler.  
Preliminary analyses of toddlers’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex and order of labeling (whether the labeling started from A1 or B1) with event (help or 
hinder), Fs < 2.01, ps > .05; the data was therefore collapsed across sex in the final analyses. 
  Results and Discussion 
Toddlers’ looking times (see Figure 19) during the final phase of the test trial were compared by a 
t-test with event (help or hinder) as the independent variable. In the all-ingroup condition the children 
who saw the help event (M = 33.1, SD = 10.8) looked reliably longer than those who saw the hinder event 
(M = 16.2, SD = 4.7), t( 15) = 4.42, p < .005, Cohen’s d = 2.03. 
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Next, we compared the looking times of the outgroup condition in Experiment 6 and those of the 
all-ingroup condition in Experiment 7. We found that the main effect of events (help or hinder) was 
significant, F(1, 28) = 29.22, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.51; the main effect of condition (outgroup or all-ingroup) 
was not significant, F(1, 28) = 2.27, p > .05, ηp2 = 0.07;the interaction between condition and event was 
not significant, F(1, 28) < 1, p > .05. Therefore, the toddlers in both the outgroup and the all-ingroup 
conditions showed the same looking pattern: they looked reliably longer at the help than at the hinder 
event. 
These findings indicate that toddlers expect individuals to act negatively toward an ingroup 
member who has previously hindered another ingroup member. Also, the similar looking patterns of the 
outgroup condition and the all-ingroup condition suggest the expectations of co-retaliation is mostly 
triggered when someone acts negatively toward a group member, regardless of whether the perpetrator 
was another ingroup or an outgroup member. Our findings are consistent with the literature on third-party 
punishment. However, the ultimate functions of punishing ingroup versus punishing outgroup 
perpetrators still need further exploration. Punishing ingroup perpetrators may mainly help promote 
cooperation within groups, while punishing outgroup perpetrators may mainly help defend one’s groups. 
Nevertheless, the expectations of co-retaliation can conceptually encompass the expectations that an 
individual should retaliate against those who have acted negatively toward his/her ingroup members. 
Therefore, the targets of co-retaliation could be an outgroup or an ingroup perpetrator. 
Discussion of Project 2 
By the second year of life, children already attend to individuals’ group membership and hold 
different expectations for ingroup and outgroup members. Both infants and toddlers expect individuals (1) 
to co-retaliate against those who have acted negatively toward ingroup members, and (2) to help ingroup 
members in need of assistance irrespective of whether they have acted negatively toward outgroup 
individuals. Therefore, young children’s expectation of retaliation is modulated by considerations of 
ingroup loyalty, suggesting that they view retaliation as a retaliatory act not just for the individual’s self-
interest, but also for the group’s interest. 
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Project 2 also provides evidence on infants’ expectations about the valence of individuals’ initial, 
as opposed to reciprocal, actions. Infants and toddlers expect individuals to act positively rather than 
negatively toward ingroup members, but they have no particular expectations about whether individuals 
should help or hinder an outgroup member without provocation. It was permissible to throw away the last 
puzzle piece (as in the outgroup-no-provocation condition of Experiments 4 and 6) or knock down a block 
of an outgroup member (as in the outgroup-no-provocation of Experiment 2). But it was not acceptable to 
do so toward an ingroup member. Therefore, infants and toddlers expect more positive initial actions 
within than across groups. 
Project 2 suggested that infants and toddlers are already sensitive to social groups signaled by 
novel artificial group markers. In this project, we examined infants’ sensitivity to physical similarity (i.e., 
salient outfits) and also toddlers’ sensitivity to naming labels. Based merely on these transient and surface 
features of the individuals, infants form social groups and have different expectations for ingroup and 
outgroup individuals. Given that the social groups used in these experiments were novel and artificial in 
nature, these expectations are not likely to be specific to a particular type of social group, but are probably 
broad expectations about how individuals should act among social groups in general.  
 Furthermore, infants are not only aware of individuals’ group membership, but they also attribute 
differentiated mental states to each member of a group. Prior research on early psychological reasoning 
has already found that when infants watch an individual act in a scene, the psychological-reasoning 
system provides infants with some core concepts about the individual’s mental states. Infants can interpret 
the individual’s actions in terms of the following: motivational states, which specify the individual’s 
motivation in the scene (e.g. goals, dispositions); informational states, which specify what accurate 
information the individual can gather about the scene through perception, memory, or inference (e.g. 
knowledge, ignorance); and fictional states, which specify whether the individual’s representation of the 
scene is incompatible with that of the infant (e.g. false belief, pretense). The cognitive subsystem that 
enables infants to attribute motivational and informational states is already operational in the first months 
of life and is well in place by the end of the first year (e.g. Csibra, 2008; Johnson, et al., 2007; Liszkowski, 
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et al., 2006; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005, 2007; Luo & Johnson, 2009; Song & Baillargeon, 2007; Tomasello 
& Haberl, 2003; Woodward, 1998). The findings from Project 2 extend our understanding of early social 
cognition. When reasoning about interactions within or across social groups, infants do not solely 
consider group members as tokens of the group; infants can interpret and predict group members’ actions 
based on the mental states of the group member, as well as on a set of socio-moral norms. 
The findings from Project 2 also provide evidence for the emergence and the continuity of early 
socio-moral expectations. Even before experiencing rich peer interactions in the preschool years, infants 
and toddlers already have rudimentary expectations about how individuals should interact with ingroup 
and outgroup members. Infants can interpret group interactions not only in dyadic, but also in triadic form, 
and they are able to consider immediate, as well as prior interactions. Infants understand that individuals’ 
behavior is affected not only by actions directed at themselves, but also by actions directed at their 
ingroup members. These early socio-moral expectations probably emerge early in life, and will be 
consolidated or modified by later experience. Future investigation is needed to examine the relations 
between early expectations and children’s reactions when they begin to engage in increasingly 
sophisticated social interactions in the preschool and early school years. 
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CHAPTER 4: PROJECT 3 ON PRIVILEGE 
Projects 1 and 2 focused on how ingroup loyalty modulates early expectations about retaliation 
(i.e., negative reciprocity). In Project 3, we examined whether the expectations about reciprocation (i.e., 
positive reciprocity) might also be modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty. We also explored 
whether children expect reciprocation in both ingroup and outgroup contexts, or if they expect it only in 
the ingroup context. 
Reciprocation (e.g. “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine”) is a critical feature of social 
interactions within groups. A social group can be thought of as a “container” of direct and indirect 
reciprocity. People tend to favor ingroup over outgroup members and they expect similar favorable 
treatment in return (e.g. Yamagishi & Kiyonair, 2000; Yamagishi et al., 1999). Studies on chimpanzees’ 
grooming behavior showed that chimpanzees groom with one another regularly within their groups. 
However, this grooming behavior rarely occurs between outgroup members. Chimpanzees use reciprocal 
grooming to maintain cooperative relationships, which ultimately influences their dominance rank and 
access to mates (e.g., Watts, 2000).  
In human societies, reciprocity is commonly expected within groups, but to a lesser extent across 
groups. For example, in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game, groups were arbitrarily formed based on 
trivial criteria, such as participants’ preferences for one painter over another.  Adults allocated more 
resources to an ingroup member than to an outgroup member. They also expected ingroup members to 
show similar favorable allocations in return (e.g., Yamagishi et al., 1999). 
Children themselves tend to reciprocate actions of an ingroup member to a greater degree than an 
outgroup member. The study by Gummerum and colleagues (2009) also investigated the reciprocation 
tendencies of adults and elementary-school children in a sequential prisoner’s game. In this game, two 
anonymous players have an initial monetary endowment, which they can sequentially exchange between 
each other.  The money they give to the other player from their endowment is doubled and added to the 
other’s endowment. In this study, all participants played as the second player. For example, both players 
initially had an endowment of 5 Euros each. Participants, as second players, were given all 5 Euros from 
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the first player, doubled. Thus, they possessed 15 Euros altogether before they decided how much to give 
back to the first player from their 15 Euros. Whatever amount participants gave to the first player would 
be doubled and added to the first player’s account. The players’ group membership was marked by their 
estimations in the dot estimation task. The results showed that adults reciprocated the first player’s 
cooperative act equally with ingroup and outgroup players. However, children from sixth grade 
reciprocated more with ingroup than with outgroup players. Naturalistic observations in preschool 
settings have also shown that 3- and 4-year-olds reciprocate object offering more often with friends than 
with non-friends during free play time (Fujisawa, Kutsukake, & Hasegawa, 2010). 
Project 3 examined early expectations about ingroup privilege and asked whether young children 
expect group members to have the privilege of being reciprocated more positively. We hypothesized that 
(1) toddlers would expect individuals to reciprocate both their ingroup and outgroup members; however, 
(3) given their considerations of ingroup loyalty, they would expect individuals to reciprocate more 
positively in response to a positive overture by an ingroup than by an outgroup member.  
We tested whether toddlers would expect an individual to reciprocate a positive overture from an 
ingroup member (Experiment 8) or from an outgroup member (Experiment 9). By comparing the results 
of Experiments 8 and 9, we examined whether toddlers expect a positive act to be reciprocated with a 
greater magnitude within compared to across groups. 
Finally, in Experiment 10, we tested whether toddlers would expect an individual to reciprocate a 
positive act when group membership was unmarked. This experiment was intended to help understand 
whether young children’s expectations of ingroup privilege are due to ingroup favoritism or outgroup 
derogation. 
Experiment 8 
Experiment 8 tested whether 3-year-old toddlers would expect an individual to reciprocate a 
positive overture from an ingroup member; and if so, then what magnitude would be viewed as 
appropriate. Membership was marked by giving the individuals novel naming labels.  
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Toddlers watched two familiarization trials and one test trial (see Figure 22). At the start of each 
familiarization trial, three individuals sat at an apparatus: A1, on the right; B1, on the left; and the target 
individual (who acted towards A1 in response to her positive overture in the test trial) sitting in the 
middle. The target individual and A1 belonged to the same group while B1 to another group. Group 
membership was identified by naming labels: in an initial trial, A1 announced, “I am a boga!” The target 
individual announced, “I am a boga, too!” Then B1 announced, “I am a mayloo!” The labels were 
repeated twice in each familiarization trial, with order counterbalanced across participants. 
In test, B1 was absent, and A1 asked the target individual to play with her, offering her one of 
two identical toy penguins. In the refuse event, the target individual crossed her arms and looked away 
from A1, who kept tilting her toy left and right until the trial ended. In the accept event, the target 
individual picked up the toy offered by A1, looked at it , then put it down and paused while looking at it 
until the trial ended. In the coordinate event, the target individual picked up the toy offered by A1, and 
then they both tilted their toys left and right in unison until the trial ended.  
We speculated that infants would expect the target individual to act positively towards A1 in 
response to her positive overture, and thus would view both the accept and the coordinate events as 
acceptable, but not the refuse event. 
Method 
Participants 
Our design called for 24 participants. Thus far, 22 healthy 3-year-old toddlers (10 male and 12) 
female from English speaking families have been tested (33 months, 0 day to 37 months, 3 days, M = 34 
months, 26 days). Another 8 toddlers were tested but excluded, one because of parental interference, and 
seven because they looked for the maximum allowed in the test trial. One third of the toddlers were 
randomly assigned to the refuse (M = 35 months, 1 days), the accept (M = 34 months, 12 days), or the 
coordinate event (M = 35 months, 3 days).  
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Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus was the same as in Experiments 6 and 7.  
Three female native speakers of English were involved in the events. A1 wore a blue shirt and 
knelt at the right window; B1 wore a green shirt and knelt at the left window; the target individual wore a 
red shirt and sat at the back window. 
During the test trial, A1 brought in two identical plastic penguins toys. Each penguin toy (6 cm X 
6.5 cm X 6.5 cm at its largest points) had a yellow body, black eyes, a white beak, pink wings, and a 
white stomach decorated with a yellow fish. 
Trials 
Familiarization trials  
The first familiarization trial only had an initial phase, which lasted 20 s. The trial began with a 
brief pause (2 s), followed by A1 announcing, “I’m a boga.” (2 s); after a 1-s pause, the target individual 
announced, “I’m a boga, too.” (2 s); then after a 1-s pause, B1 announced, “I’m a mayloo.” (2 s) The 
labels were repeated twice. The order of labeling was counterbalanced across participants (half of the 
children saw the labeling start with A1, and half saw the labeling start with B1). Next, the computer 
signaled the end of the event, and the supervisor lowered the curtain in front of the apparatus.  
The second familiarization trial was identical to the first familiarization trial. 
Test trial 
The test trial consisted of an initial and a final phase. The initial phase lasted about 16 s. B1 was 
absent and the left window was completely closed with an opaque white curtain. After a pause (2 s), A1 
held up both toys and oriented them toward the target individual (2 s). A1 tilted both toys left and right in 
unison (4 s). Then A1 placed both toys down on the apparatus floor, one in front of herself and the other 
in front of the target individual (1 s). After a pause (1 s), A1 grasped the toy in front of herself, held it up, 
and oriented it toward the target individual (2 s). A1 then started to tilt her toy left and right (1 s). 
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In the refuse event, the target individual crossed her arms, looked away from A1 and paused (3 s). 
During the final phase, the target individual paused with her arms crossed and her head turned away, 
while A1 continued tilting her toy left and right until the event ended. 
In the accept event, the target individual picked up the toy offered by A1 and held it in front of 
herself with both hands and looked at it (2 s). She then put it down on the apparatus floor, withdrew both 
hands on her lap, looked down at the toy, and paused, while A1 continued tilting her toy left and right in 
unison until the trial ended (1 s). 
In the coordinate event, the target individual picked up the toy offered by A1 with her right hand 
(1 s) and tilted the toy to left and right (2 s). During the final phase, both the target individual and A1 kept 
tiling their toys left and right in unison until the trial ended. 
Procedure 
The toddlers were highly attentive during the familiarization trials and looked for 20/20 s on 
average.  
Next, each toddler watched a single test trial; one third of the toddlers saw the refuse event, one 
third saw the accept event, and one third saw the coordinate event. The toddlers were attentive during the 
initial phase and looked for 15.9/16 s on average. The final phase ended when the toddler (1) looked away 
for 0.5 consecutive seconds after having looked for at least 10 cumulative seconds, or (2) looked for 60 
cumulative seconds without looking away for 0.5 consecutive seconds. 
The primary observer was absent from the test room during the familiarization trials and therefore 
did not know whether the infant was assigned to the ingroup (Experiment 8) or the outgroup condition 
(Experiment 9). Interobserver agreement during the final phase of the test trial was calculated for 20/22 
infants (only one observer was present for the other infants) and averaged 93% per toddler. 
Preliminary analyses of toddlers’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex and order of labeling (whether the labeling started from A1 or B1) with event (refuse, 
accept or coordinate), Fs < 3.04, ps > .10; the data was therefore collapsed across sex and order of 
labeling in the final analyses. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Toddlers’ looking times (see Figure 23) during the final phase of the test trial were compared by 
an ANOVA with event (refuse, accept, coordinate) as a between-subjects factor. The effect of event was 
marginally significant, F (2, 19) = 3.30, p = .059, ηp2 = 0.19. Planned comparisons indicated that the 
toddlers who saw the refuse event (M = 25.3, SD = 3.6) looked reliably longer than those who saw either 
the accept (M = 18.1, SD = 5.6) or the coordinate event (M = 18.6, SD = 7.5), Fs (1, 19) > 4.86, ps < .05; 
the looking times at the accept and the coordinate events were approximately the same, F (1, 19) < 1. 
 The toddlers thus expected the target individual, following her ingroup member A1’s friendly 
overture, to reciprocate either by simply accepting the toy or by playing with the toy in coordinated 
rhythm with A1. Also, the toddlers considered it unacceptable to refuse A1’s friendly offer by crossing 
her arms and turning away. These findings suggest that toddlers expect individuals to reciprocate a 
positive act by an ingroup member, and that they consider refusal as negative and as an inappropriate 
response to an ingroup member’s friendly overture. 
Experiment 9 
 Experiment 9 tested whether 3-year-old toddlers would expect the target individual to reciprocate 
a positive overture made by an outgroup member. In addition, we examined whether the toddlers would 
expect the target individual to responds to a positive action by an outgroup member less positively 
compared to an ingroup member.  
The findings from Projects 1 and 2, as well as prior studies (e.g., Over & Carpenter, 2009) 
suggest that children expect the initial (as opposed to reciprocal) action toward an ingroup member to be 
positive rather than negative, but that children have no particular expectation about whether the initial 
action toward an outgroup member will be positive or negative. In other words, the baseline for the 
valence of interactions in the ingroup versus outgroup condition may be more positive within than those 
across groups. Therefore, we speculated that the toddlers would expect different magnitudes of 
reciprocation from an ingroup versus an outgroup member. 
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The toddlers watched trials that were identical to those used in Experiment 8, except that the 
target individual and A1 belonged to different groups (see Figure 24). Therefore, in the beginning of each 
familiarization trial, A1 announced, “I am a boga!” The target individual announced, “I am a mayloo!” 
Then B1 announced, “I am a mayloo, too!”  
 We speculated that toddlers would expect the target individual (1) to reciprocate an outgroup 
member’s friendly overture; and (2) to respond less enthusiastically to the outgroup member’s friendly 
overture. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 24 healthy 3-year-old toddlers from English speaking families, 12 male and 12 
female (30 months, 12 day to 37 months, 22 days, M = 34 months, 18 days). Another 2 toddlers were 
tested but excluded, one because she was upset and the other one because he looked for the maximum 
allowed in the test trial. Eight toddlers were randomly assigned to the refuse (M = 33 months, 29 days), 
the accept (M = 34 months, 16 days), and the coordinate event (M = 35 months, 9 days).  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical with those used in Experiment 8.  
Trials 
Familiarization trials 
The first familiarization trial only had an initial phase, which lasted about 20 s. The trial began 
with a brief pause (2 s), followed by A1 announcing, “I’m a boga.” (2 s); after a 1-s pause, the target 
individual announced, “I’m a mayloo.” (2 s); then after a 1-s pause, B1 announced, “I’m a mayloo, too.” 
(2 s) The labels were repeated twice. The order of labeling was counterbalanced across participants; half 
of the children saw the labeling start from A1 while the other half saw the labeling start from B1. Next, 
the computer signaled the end of the event, and the supervisor lowered the curtain in front of the 
apparatus. The second familiarization event was identical to the first familiarization. 
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Test trial  
The test trial was identical to that in Experiment 8 (each toddler watched a refuse, an accept, or a 
coordinate event). 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the one used in Experiment 8. The toddlers were highly attentive 
and looked for 19.4/20 s on average during the familiarization trials and for 16/16 s during the initial 
phase of the test trial. Interobserver agreement during the final phase of the test trial was calculated for 
22/24 toddlers (only one observer was present for the other infants) and averaged 94% per toddler. 
Preliminary analyses of toddlers’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex and order of labeling (whether the labeling started from A1 or B1) with event (refuse, 
accept or coordinate), Fs < 1.02, ps > .39; the data was therefore collapsed across sex and order of 
labeling in the final analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
Toddlers’ looking times (see Figure 23) during the final phase of the test trial were compared by 
an ANOVA with event (refuse, accept or coordinate) as a between-subjects factor. The effect of event 
was significant, F (2, 21) = 8.93, p < .005, ηp2 = 0.46. Planned comparisons indicated that the toddlers 
who saw the coordinate event (M = 28.3, SD = 8.5) looked reliably longer than those who saw the accept 
(M = 16.3, SD = 5.8) or the refuse event (M = 16.2, SD = 4.8), Fs (1, 21) > 13.39, ps < .005; the looking 
times at the accept and the refuse event were approximately the same, F (1, 21) < 1. 
The toddlers’ looking times in Experiments 8 (ingroup condition) and 9 (outgroup condition) 
were analyzed by an ANOVA, with event and condition as two between-subject factors. The interaction 
between event and condition was significant, F (2, 40) = 8.84, p < .005, ηp2 = 0.31. The main effects of 
condition and event were not significant, Fs <1. Planned interaction comparisons indicated that the 
toddlers who saw the refuse event in the ingroup condition looked reliably longer than those who saw the 
same event in the outgroup condition, F (1, 40) = 7.94, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.17; the toddlers who saw the 
coordinate event in the outgroup condition looked reliably longer than those who saw the same event in 
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the ingroup condition, F (1, 40) = 9.67, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.19; the looking times at the accept event were 
approximately the same in the ingroup and the outgroup conditions, F (1, 40) < 1. 
The finding with the accept event was similar to that of the ingroup condition in Experiment 8. 
The toddlers expected the target individual to simply accept the toy offered by an outgroup member. Thus, 
toddlers viewed neutral acceptance of a friendly invitation as appropriate in both ingroup and outgroup 
interactions. 
The results with the coordinate event suggested that the toddlers considered it unexpected for the 
target individual to engage in coordinate play with her outgroup member, A1. One possible explanation is 
that infants viewed playing in coordinated rhythm as a signature of within-group interactions. Prior 
evidence has shown that infants already expect members of a group to cohere and move together (e.g. 
Premack & Premack, 1997; Sloane et al., under review; Sugarman, 1983). Therefore, when the toddlers in 
Experiment 9 saw the target individual and A1 tilt the toys left and right in unison, the toddlers inferred 
that the two belonged to the same group. This was inconsistent with the toddlers’ initial categorization 
suggested by the novel labels. This inconsistency led the toddlers to reconsider the individuals’ group 
membership and hence to look longer at the coordinate event. Another possibility, though not 
contradictory to the first one, is that the toddlers viewed the coordinate event as too positive and beyond 
the range of reciprocatory action expected toward an outgroup member. In Project 1, we found that the 
infants had expectations about the range of retaliatory action in response to a provocation, and they 
detected a violation if the retaliation was outside the expected range, either too severe or too mild. 
Similarly, toddlers might have found the coordinate event beyond the upper limit of the range of 
reciprocatory action expected toward an outgroup member. 
The results with the refuse event suggested that the toddlers considered it permissible for the 
target individual to refuse to play with an outgroup member. Would this not be a violation of reciprocity? 
As found in Projects 2 and 3, mild aggression toward outgroup members is tolerated without provocation, 
as though it is seen as part of the acceptable “neutral” range for interactions among individuals from 
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different groups. Therefore, when an individual receives a positive overture from an outgroup member, a 
refusal may be viewed as neutral rather than as negative for an outgroup member. 
Overall, the results of this experiment suggest that the range of expected actions in response to a 
friendly overture is “shifted” towards the positive, compared to neutral situations. Because of the different 
baseline for the valence of interactions in the ingroup versus outgroup condition, reciprocatory action is 
expected to be more positive toward ingroup than toward outgroup members. The expected responses to 
an ingroup member’s friendly overture range from mildly positive actions (e.g., accepting the offered toy) 
to moderately positive actions (e.g., playing in coordinated rhythm), whereas the expected responses to a 
outgroup member’s positive overture range from mildly negative actions (e.g., refusing to play together) 
to mildly positive action (e.g., accepting the offered toy).  
It is important to continue investigating the limit of negative action in response to a positive 
overture in the outgroup condition in the future. Our speculation is that toddlers might view throwing 
away the toy offered by the outgroup member as unacceptable, but view it as permissible without the 
friendly overture.  This would also be supported by the results we found in the outgroup-no-provocation 
conditions of Project 3. 
Therefore, toddlers expect individuals to follow the norm of reciprocation in both the ingroup and 
the outgroup conditions, in other words, toddlers expect individuals to act positively or at least 
moderately in response to positive act. But they expect individuals to reciprocate with a greater magnitude 
with ingroup members than with outgroup members. 
Experiment 10 
Experiment 10 examined whether 3-year-old toddlers would expect individuals to reciprocate a 
positive overture when group membership was unmarked. More specifically, we asked whether toddlers 
would consider it acceptable for the target individual to refuse playing with another individual whose 
group membership was unmarked, versus playing with that individual in a coordinated rhythm. 
The toddlers watched a single test trial identical to the one in Experiments 8 and 9, but they did 
not know the labels of the three individuals (see Figure 25). In this test trial, the left experiment was 
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absent, and the right experimenter (RE) invites the target individual to play with her, offering her one of 
two identical toy penguins. In the refuse event, the target individual crossed her arms and looked away 
from RE, who kept tilting her toy left and right until the trial ended. In the coordinate event, the target 
individual picked up the toy offered by RE, and then they both tilted their toys left and right in unison 
until the trial ended. Given that the accept event was considered as acceptable in both the ingroup and 
outgroup conditions, we did not run the accept event in Experiment 10. 
Prior research with adults indicates that ingroup bias is not a direct result of outgroup derogation, 
which reduces the level of cooperation toward outgroup individuals compared to neutral individuals 
whose group membership is unmarked; instead, ingroup bias results from ingroup favoritism, which 
increases the level of cooperation toward ingroup individuals compared to neutral individuals (Brewer, 
1979, 1999; Koopmans & Rebers, 2009, Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009). For example, in a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma Game, Japanese adult participants contributed more to an ingroup partner than to an outgroup or 
a neutral partner whose group membership was unknown. In other words, the participants did not treat the 
outgroup partner and the neutral partner differently, but they did treat their ingroup partner more 
positively (e.g., Koopmans & Rebers, 2009). Moreover, when group membership is private knowledge 
(i.e., unknown for other group members), participants cannot expect in-group favoring behavior from the 
in-group member; therefore, bias toward ingroup members is no longer displayed (e.g., Yamagishi et al., 
2005, 2008). Therefore, it is necessary to know the two players’ group membership in order for the in-
group bias to emerge.  
We speculated that the toddlers would treat the unmarked condition the same as the outgroup 
condition.  Therefore, toddlers in the unmarked condition would look longer at the coordinate than at the 
refuse event, just as in the outgroup condition of Experiment 9. 
Method 
Participants 
Our designed called for 16 participants. So far, we have texted 13 healthy 3-year-old toddlers (7 
male and 6 female) from English speaking families (32 months, 2 day to 35 months, 13 days, M = 34 
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months, 8 days). Another 4 toddlers were tested but excluded, one because he had a looking time that was 
over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean of the condition in the test trial, and three because they looked 
for the maximum allowed in the test trial. Half of the toddlers saw the refuse event (M = 34 months, 3 
days) and half saw the coordinate event (M = 34 months, 18 days).  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
The apparatus and stimuli were identical to those used in Experiments 8 and 9.  
Trials 
 Experiment 10, unlike Experiments 8 and 9, included no familiarization trial because no labels 
were announced to indicate the group membership. 
Test trial 
Each toddler received only a single test trial in which they saw either a refuse or a coordinate 
event.  These were identical to those used in Experiments 8 and 9.  
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the one used in Experiments 8 and 9. The toddlers were highly 
attentive during the initial phase and looked for 15.9/16 s on average in the test trial. Interobserver 
agreement during the final phases of the test trials was calculated for 12/13 infants (only one observer was 
present for the other infant) and averaged 95% per trial per infant. 
Preliminary analyses of toddlers’ looking times during the final phase of the test trial revealed no 
interaction of sex with event (refuse or coordinate), F(1, 9) < 1. The data was therefore collapsed across 
sex in the final analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
Toddlers’ looking times (see Figure 26) during the final phase of the test trial were compared by a 
t-test with event (refuse or coordinate) as an independent variable. The effect of event was marginally 
significant, t (11) = 2.05, p = .06, suggesting that the toddlers who saw the coordinate event (M = 25.5, 
SD = 8.2) looked longer than those who saw the refuse event (M = 19.3, SD =2.6), Cohen’s d = 1.02. 
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The toddlers’ looking times at the coordinate event and the refuse event in Experiments 8 
(ingroup condition), 9 (outgroup condition), and 10 (unmarked condition) were analyzed by an ANOVA, 
with event and condition as between-subjects factors. The interaction between event and condition was 
significant, F (2, 38) = 9.14, p < .005, ηp2 = 0.35. Planned interaction comparison indicated that the 
looking patterns of the ingroup and outgroup conditions were significantly different, F (1, 38) = 17.91, p 
< .05, ηp2 = 0.32; the looking patterns of the ingroup and unmarked conditions were also significantly 
different, F (1, 38) = 15.45, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.29; however, the looking patterns of the outgroup and 
unmarked conditions were not significantly different, F (1, 38) = 1.59, p > .05, ηp2 = 0.04. 
These findings show that the toddlers treated the outgroup and unmarked conditions similarly. 
This suggests that the toddlers expected the individuals to respond more positively and enthusiastically in 
the ingroup condition than in either the outgroup or the unmarked condition.  
Discussion of Project 3 
Consistent with the results from Project 2, the toddlers in Project 3 attended to individuals’ group 
membership marked by novel naming labels, and they held different expectations for ingroup and 
outgroup members. The results of Project 3 suggest that early expectations about reciprocation, similar to 
those about retaliation, are modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty. Toddlers, by 3 years, already 
expect ingroup members to have the privilege of being reciprocated more positively than outgroup 
members.  
Is this privilege rooted in out-group hatred or ingroup love? The findings of Project 3 suggest that 
toddlers treat the outgroup condition as equivalent to the neutral, unmarked condition. The difference in 
the expected magnitude of reciprocation between the ingroup and outgroup conditions is due to an 
increase in magnitude of reciprocation for ingroup members, but not due to a decrease in magnitude of 
reciprocation for outgroup members. Therefore, the expected ingroup privilege is primary caused by 
ingroup love rather than outgroup hatred. These findings are consistent with the claim in the adult 
literature that people have no intrinsic “outgroup hatred,” but only “ingroup love” (e.g. Brewer, 1979).  
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The early expectation of ingroup privilege is probably a byproduct of social exchange and sharing 
that takes place within the boundaries of a group. On the one hand, there are potentially more interactions 
with ingroup members in daily lives. Immediate reciprocation is important for within-group cooperation 
to arise, which promote reciprocation in the future (e.g. Yamagishi & Kiyonair, 2000; Yamagishi et al., 
1999). The positivity within a group is reinforced by the frequent and recurring interactions with group 
members. On the other hand, interactions with outgroup members is relatively infrequent, and hence 
individuals have less incentives to reinforce future positive actions by outgroup members. In addition, 
coordination with an outgroup member may violate one’s sense of ingroup loyalty which can be costly 
(e.g., Brewer, 1999). This idea was also supported by the results of the coordinate events in Experiments 
9 and 10. Therefore, the expected ingroup privilege is a natural outcome of our constrained social circles. 
In modern societies with increases in travel and access to information as well as political and economical 
interdependence, we have more contacts with outgroup members than our ancestors, and thus our 
tendency to grant privilege to group members may be attenuated. 
The results from Projects 2 and 3 together suggest that 3-year-old children consider naming labels 
sufficient to establish group membership, even when the labels are just nonsense nouns. This confirms the 
robust effect of labeling on social categorization (e.g., Bigler, 1995; Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; 
Bigler, Brown, & Markell, 2001). These results also suggest that social categorization is malleable at least 
in early years. In our experiments, the experimenters varied naturally in the color of their skins, hair, eyes, 
and so on. Three-year-olds categorizes the experimenters based on their announced labels. This indicates 
that children may be able to re-categorize people of different races, genders, and ages based on new labels. 
This flexibility may be evolutionarily adaptive for children to infer, from environmental cues, which 
bases of categorization are important within a given context (Bigler & Liben, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The norm of reciprocity, including both retaliation and reciprocation, is widely considered to be 
one of the fundamental norms guiding human social interactions (e.g., Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Fry, 2006; 
Gouldner, 1960; Jackendoff, 2007; Premack, 1990). The results of the present projects show that infants 
and toddlers have general expectations about reciprocity both within and across groups.  Moreover, their 
expectations of retaliation and reciprocation are modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty. 
Specifically, infants and toddlers have the following expectations for social interactions:  (1) more severe 
retaliation against outgroup than against ingroup members (expectation of escalation); (2) retaliation 
against outgroup members who have acted negatively toward an ingroup member other than oneself 
(expectation of co-retaliation); and (3) more positive reciprocation with ingroup than with outgroup 
members (expectation of privilege). 
As shown in the proposed model (see Figure 27), the range of expected actions shifts based on 
two major factors: (1) whether the two individuals belong to the same or different groups (ingroup vs. 
outgroup condition); (2) whether there has been a prior initial action, and if so, whether the reciprocal 
action occurs in response to a negative initial action (i.e., retaliatory action) or to a positive initial action 
(i.e., reciprocatory action). The scale of the diagram is ordinal rather than ratio (e.g., the distance between 
mildly and moderately negative may not be exactly the same as between moderately and extremely 
negative).  
The results of the present projects suggest that the baseline for an initial action between ingroup 
members is more positive than between outgroup members. Infants expect individuals to act positively 
toward ingroup members while they have no particular expectations about whether initial actions toward 
outgroup members should be (mildly) positive or negative. In reality, the range of acceptable actions 
toward ingroup versus outgroup members probably varies depending on the nature of the specific group 
membership. The initial actions toward family members are expected to be more positive whereas the 
initial actions toward war enemies are expected to be more negative. Here, the diagram depicts a general 
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range of acceptable initial actions among members of horizontal and moderate social groups, which 
involve neither group hierarchy nor personal intimacy. 
Furthermore, the range of acceptable retaliatory actions are expected to be more negative than the 
range of acceptable initial actions, with a “shift” toward the negative end of the spectrum in both the 
ingroup and outgroup conditions. Of course, the degree of the “shift” toward the negative end also 
depends on the severity of the provocation (e.g., from stealing a cracker to threatening one’s life). 
Importantly, because of the different baselines, retaliatory actions are relatively more negative in 
outgroup than in ingroup conditions. Mild negative actions toward outgroup members are not inhibited in 
the first placed and then moderate retaliation are expected in response to those negative actions, which 
eventually caused spiral escalation of conflicts among groups. 
Correspondingly, the range of acceptable reciprocatory actions may be expected to be more 
positive than initial actions in both the ingroup and the outgroup conditions. Reciprocation may result in a 
“shift” toward the positive end of the spectrum for these interactions, but because of the different 
baselines, reciprocatory actions are relatively more positive in the ingroup than in the outgroup condition. 
The distance of the “shift” toward the positive end depends on the magnitude of the initial positive act 
(e.g., from offering a toy to saving one’s life). In Project 3, A1’s friendly overture (i.e., offering a toy to 
play) was mildly positive, and therefore the “shift” was quite subtle. Future investigation on the limits of 
responses to a positive act is needed. For example, evidence that toddlers view throwing away the toy 
offered by the outgroup member as unacceptable but view it as permissible without the friendly overture 
would provide evidence for the “shift” of reciprocatory actions. 
In addition, we found that the expectations of escalation and co-retaliation were already present in 
the second year of life and the expectation of privilege was present in by at least the third year of life. We 
have not yet tested whether infants in the second year of life also expect that ingroup members should 
have the privilege of being reciprocated more positively. However,  we believe that this expectation of 
ingroup privilege is also likely to emerge in infancy, because infants already show consistent favoritism to 
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ingroup over outgroup members (e.g., Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007; Mahajan & Wynn, 2010; Olson 
& Spelke, 2008; Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2009; Werneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). 
The presence of these socio-moral expectations is important, as they help young children interpret 
the social interactions they observe on a daily basis, anticipate the effects of their own actions toward 
others, and perhaps also help them to distinguish between individuals who are more or less likely to 
reciprocate positive actions or retaliate after negative interactions. As children grow up, they need to 
weather the storm of social situations, such as receiving a friendly invitation, being mistreated by a bully, 
or being called on for help. Early socio-moral expectations become part of the resources that guide 
children’s reasoning and behavior in these local social situations. 
The results of present projects also provide insights that help formulate answers to the following 
questions: 
1. What are early expectations about initiating behavior? 
Similar to adults, infants and toddlers generally act more positively toward ingroup than toward 
outgroup individuals even without any prior interactions with those individuals (e.g., Kinzler, Dupoux, & 
Spelke, 2007; Mahajan & Wynn, 2010; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2009; Werneken 
& Tomasello, 2006, 2007). This group bias is more likely to be driven by ingroup love than by outgroup 
hatred. Thus, outgroup hatred is less likely to be an intrinsic part of human nature than its counterpart, 
ingroup love (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009). The results of this series of experiments 
suggest that infants already have different expectations about actions initiated toward ingroup and 
outgroup members. These early expectations about people’s initial actions are important for establishing a 
baseline for understanding infants’ and toddlers’ expectations about intergroup interactions, because these 
group-specific set-points lead to differences in magnitude of reciprocation and retaliation as discussed 
above. 
As an expansion of the idea that intergroup bias results from ingroup love rather than outgroup 
hatred, Yamagishi and colleagues (1999; 2000) suggest that a social group is a “container” of generalized 
reciprocity. People act positively within their own group and also expect other group members to treat 
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them positively. For example, in the study by Karp and colleagues (1993), Japanese participants were 
asked to divide 500 yen between an ingroup and an outgroup member (the group member was marked by 
overestimating or underestimating the number of dots in a dot estimation task).In addition, they were told 
that each participant would receive an allocation from both an ingroup and an outgroup, and their final 
payment would be the average of the two allocations. Results revealed that participants favored ingroup 
over outgroup members only when the participant was also the target of other participants’ allocation 
decisions. However, when participant’s own pay was fixed, and was not dependent on other participants’ 
allocation decisions, ingroup favoritism did not emerge. Ingroup favoritism also disappeared when the 
participants did not expect to receive a favorable allocation from other in-group members, or when their 
group membership was private (as opposed to common) knowledge (e.g., Yamagishi et al., 2005, 2008). 
Infants’ ambivalent expectations about initial actions toward outgroup members, as found in 
Project 3, may be adaptive to the diverse intergroup relations in the world. In some pre-industrial cultures, 
hostile behavior toward outgroup members is praised and morally sanctioned; but in other cultures, which 
highly embrace egalitarianism, people tend to disapprove of outgroup hostility (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 
2007). Children have to observe and learn the best strategies to use when interacting with outgroup 
members. This flexibility can help children adapt to whatever culture they were born into. 
2. How does ingroup loyalty manifest in reciprocal interactions? 
The present projects provide evidence that infants and toddlers are already sensitive to a broad 
range of social group markers, from common social factors of race, gender, age, or accent, to arbitrary 
group markers based on clothing or novel names. In our experiments, infants and toddlers immediately 
formed different expectations for ingroup and outgroup individuals, even when they themselves were not 
affiliated with any of those groups, nor did they have prior exposure to those groups.   
Infants’ considerations of ingroup loyalty are manifested in reciprocal interactions in several 
ways. Infants expect individuals to provide assistance to group members, to grant privilege to group 
members when reciprocating positive acts (e.g., engage in coordinated actions), to protect group members 
through co-retaliation, and to maintain harmony within a group by refraining from unprovoked aggression 
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and escalated retaliation. Therefore, more positivity is expected for the initial actions toward ingroup than 
toward outgroup members; also, because of the different baselines, more positive reciprocation and less 
severe retaliation are expected within than across groups. 
These expectations may encompass crucial facets of infants’ rudimentary understanding of 
ingroup loyalty. They may be some basic social rules that help infants reason about interactions within as 
compared to across groups. As pointed out by Hirschfeld (2001), understanding and acting according to 
the affordance of social groups is very important for children.  Children have to know “who’s who” in a 
social environment, how to predict what other people are likely to do, and how to prepare interactions 
with both ingroup and outgroup members. 
3. Is reciprocity the foundation of other socio-moral norms? 
 Reciprocity, the reward of kind acts and the punishment of unkind acts, is often described as one 
of the basic norms that guide social interactions (e.g., Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Stripada & Stich, 2007). 
Reciprocity constitutes a key aspect of morality in societies from around the world (e.g., Brown, 1991; 
Fry, 2006). In the Descent of Man, originally published in 1871, Charles Darwin proposes that reciprocity 
is the “foundation of morality.” 
The present projects explored how the norm of reciprocity is modulated by the norm of ingroup 
loyalty, and found that infants and toddlers already have rich expectations about retaliatory and 
reciprocatory behaviors in intergroup contexts. These findings not only provide evidence for the breadth 
of early socio-moral expectations, they also raise interesting questions about the relationship between the 
norm of reciprocity and other socio-moral norms, such as the norms of fairness and welfare.  
Here are some of our conjectures. The norms of fairness and welfare together balance behaviors 
in intergroup contexts. The norm of fairness motivates individuals to initiate positive actions (e.g., 
distributing resources fairly) toward outgroup members, and also promotes fair reciprocation of positive 
acts by outgroup members (e.g., rewarding efforts fairly). The norm of welfare inhibits extreme 
unprovoked aggression toward outgroup members and also limits the severity of escalated retaliation 
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against outgroup members. Therefore, these seemingly conflicting socio-moral norms actually 
complement and balance each other in guiding people’s moral judgments and behaviors. 
4. Is infant morality primarily driven by emotions or cognition? 
Philosophical debates regarding the emotional versus cognitive basis of morality have caught a 
lot of attention for several centuries. The emotion-based approach and the principle-based approach hold 
divergent opinions on whether morality is primarily driven by automatic emotions or by tacit principles 
(i.e., cognition). 
The emotion-based approach emphasizes the role of emotions in the generation and development 
of moral judgments (e.g., Haidt, 2001; 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Reasoning is the “slave of the 
passions” and provides mostly post-hoc justifications for gut reactions. This approach predicts that early 
moral expectations should primarily be triggered by external emotional stimuli, such as how violent 
actions are (a bottom-up process).  
On the other hand, the principle-based approach argues that moral principles are the foundation 
upon which moral emotions are based (e.g., Dupoux & Jacob, 2007; Dwyer, 2007; Geraci & Surian, in 
press; Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, 2007; Jackendoff, 2007; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Mikhail, 2007; Premack, 
2007; Raw, 1971). Infants and toddlers have some rudimentary expectations of moral principles and they 
can use these moral principles to make sense of individuals’ actions in specific contexts. Their moral 
emotions, if any, are triggered by a violation of moral principles.  According to this approach, early socio-
moral expectations are generated by applying internal moral principles to particular contextual factors (a 
top-down process). 
The present projects provide evidence for the principle-based approach. Emotional responses 
alone cannot explain early socio-moral expectations. The results of our projects demonstrate that children 
are engaged in cognitive processing as they evaluate particular contextual factors and generate socio-
moral expectations accordingly. For example, infants and toddlers can already (1) consider the intergroup 
context (e.g., whether individuals belong to the same or different groups); (2) consider the prior history of 
interactions among the individuals (e.g., the presence of prior provocation, the previous actions targeted 
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toward the individual’s ingroup members as well as those targeted toward the individual him/herself); (3) 
attribute differentiated mental states to each member of a group (e.g., the individuals’ motivations and 
intentions; their knowledge and ignorance; and their false beliefs and pretense). Therefore, infants and 
toddlers can already take into account not only the outcomes of actions, but also the contexts in which the 
actions occur. They deploy multiple cognitive processes (e.g., feature recognition, social categorization, 
event memory, psychological reasoning, etc.) and apply moral principles flexibly to novel contexts. This 
early sensitivity to these contextual factors supports the principle-based (as opposed to the emotion-based) 
approach.  
In addition, the developmental gap between prosocial behavior and prosocial emotions may 
suggest that the emergence of morality does not rely on moral emotions. Prior research suggests that 
children’s prosocial behaviors appear before the emergence of prosocial emotions. During the first year of 
life, object sharing and instrumental helping behaviors already emerge, even though children do not yet 
show empathic responses toward another’s distress; during the second year of life, indifference toward 
another’s distress decreases and prosocial behavior is more evident; during the third year of life, prosocial 
actions and emotions become more regulated and selective such that it is show to some but not to all 
potential recipients (Hay & Rheingold, 1983; Vaish et al., 2009; Werneken & Tomasello, 2007; Zahn-
Waxler et al., 1992; Zahn-Waxler et al., 2001). Therefore, it is unlikely that infant morality is based solely 
on emotions or relies on gut feelings, since there is a delay in the development of moral emotions. 
5. Does morality emerge early in life? 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, two very broad views have been offered on the origin of morality. On 
the one hand, the late-acquisition view argues that children acquire morality through extensive learning 
and socialization. On the other hand, the early-emergence view argues that children are born with a rich 
innate basis for understanding social interactions and that the knowledge of morality emerges early in life.  
 The present projects provide evidence that (1) infants and toddlers, as bystanders, expect 
unfamiliar individuals to reciprocate or retaliate in accordance with the norm of reciprocity; (2) they are 
already sensitive to novel markers of social groups and expect individuals to favor their group members in 
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accordance with the norm of ingroup loyalty; (3) their expectations of reciprocity are modulated by 
considerations of ingroup loyalty in a predictable way; (4) they take contextual factors into account when 
predicting or interpreting others’ actions and interactions. Therefore, infants and toddlers already have 
rich socio-moral expectations about the interactions among individuals. These expectations emerge early 
in life. The results in both infants and toddlers also provide evidence for the continuity of these early 
socio moral expectations. 
6. How does social experience influence early socio-moral expectations? 
The results from the present projects support the principle-based, early-emergence view of early 
socio-moral expectations. This is not to say, of course, that experience plays little role in the development 
of morality. The early socio-moral expectations will be consolidated or modified by later experience at 
least in both the family and culture levels.  
First of all, parental practices related to morality vary from family to family. For instance, great 
diversity exists regarding how to help children cope with intergroup relations and how to teach children 
strategies for succeeding in mainstream society. For example, different families have different practices 
dealing with the issue of race. These parental practices can be grouped into four kinds. (1) Cultural 
socialization refers to the parental practices that teach children about their racial heritage and history; they 
promote cultural customs and traditions, as well as children’s cultural, racial, and ethnic pride. For 
example, parents may talk to children about important historical or cultural figures; expose children to 
culturally relevant books, music, and stories; celebrate cultural holidays; eat ethnic foods; and encourage 
children to use their family’s native language. (2) Preparation for bias refers to parental efforts to 
promote their children’s awareness of discrimination and prepare them to cope with it. Discussions about 
discrimination often emerge as a theme of parents’ narratives. Some helpful strategies regarding how to 
deal with discrimination may be offered by the parents. (3) Promotion of mistrust refers to practices that 
emphasize the need for wariness and distrust in interracial interactions. Mistrust may be communicated in 
parents’ cautions or warnings to children about other racial groups, or in their cautions about barriers to 
success. Parents may teach their children defensive racial protocols and emphasize social distance or 
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mistrust. (4) Egalitarianism and silence refers to the practice that parents either explicitly encourage their 
children to value individual qualities over racial group membership or avoid any mention of race in 
discussions with their children (Hughes, et al., 2006). 
Certain parents may also emphasize some norms more than others. As mentioned in the 
beginning of Chapter 1, children are regularly exposed to various moral lessons (e.g., Miller et al., 2001). 
Parents immerse children in environments that are rich in stories and examples related to morality. Those 
stories and examples may trigger the innate moral modules and be connected to socio-moral principles 
through the parent-and child discourses. 
The influence of experience on socio-moral development not only occurs in the family level, but 
also in the culture level. Here are several ways that culture may shape young children’s moral judgment 
and behavior.  
(1) Children learn the culturally-appropriate paths to justice in reciprocity and more specifically 
retaliation. For example, although cultural practices tend to stick to the norm of reciprocity at a 
fundamental level, the “payment currency” is extremely variable from culture to culture. The price for 
misdeeds can be physical punishment, social ridicule, withdrawal of support, or demand for material 
compensation. Reciprocity interacts with various features of a culture, such as social organization. People 
living in nomadic hunter-gatherer bands are more likely to choose self-redress revenge for retaliation, 
whereas people living in societies with complex social organizations are more likely to turn to the police 
or the government for third-party punishment (e.g., Fry, 2006). Therefore, social environment has an 
important role in shaping the specific paths that people choose to reciprocate or retaliate. 
(2) The norm of ingroup loyalty is enriched and elaborated by social information that children are 
exposed to in daily life. Although children already pay attention to social group markers during infancy, 
they still need to acquire further information about what or who constitutes an ingroup or an outgroup 
member. They also need to learn the specific expressions of ingroup loyalty in their social context, 
through observation or direct experience (e.g., Hirschfeld, 2001).   
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Children gradually understand the meanings of particular group markers through cultural learning. 
For example, Dunham, Baron, and Banaji (2006) examined whether children’s and adults’ implicit 
attitudes are sensitive to the cultural prestige of a given group. Participants’ implicit attitudes toward both 
a relatively high-status outgroup and a relatively low-status outgroup were measured by the Implicit 
Attitude Test (IAT). For European American participants, Japanese have a relatively high status while 
African Americans have a relatively low status; for Japanese participants, European Americans have a 
relatively high status while African Americans have a relatively low status. The results were consistent 
across age groups.  They suggest that across both populations and types of outgroup tested, implicit bias 
toward ingroup members was robustly present by age 6. Moreover, implicit bias against low-status 
outgroup members emerges early and remains stable with age, while implicit bias against high-status 
outgroup members appears to undergo a gradual, age-related decline in strength. Therefore, the prestige 
enjoyed by a group moderates implicit bias as greater knowledge of group status is acquired through 
cultural learning.  
The results of the present projects also support the malleability of early social categorization. Our 
experimenters naturally varied in terms of color of skin, hair, eyes and so on. However, when they were 
merely marked by some artificial or transient feature (such as their labels and outfits), infants and toddlers 
were already able to group them accordingly and form different expectations for ingroup and outgroup 
members. 
(3) Children have to learn the significance of various norms and how they are implemented in a 
particular culture. Dupoux and Jacob (2007) argue that each culture has its own ranking and elaboration 
of a finite set of universal moral norms. Work by Shweder and colleagues (1995) expanded on this idea 
by analyzing the practice of arranging “who sleep by whom” at night among Indian and North-American 
middle-class families.  They then extracted moral values from these practices. They found that both 
cultures extremely valued incest avoidance. Therefore sexually-active unmarried males and females 
within the family should avoid co-sleeping, which may lead to either sexual temptation, or suspicion of 
sexual contact. However, the two cultures had different emphasis for the sleeping arrangements of their 
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children. Indian families emphasized protection of the vulnerable: children are highly valued members of 
the family and they are needy and fragile.  Therefore, they should not be left alone at night. North 
American families emphasized autonomy: children are highly valued members of the family and while 
they are needy and fragile, they should be encouraged to be alone at night so that they can learn to be self-
reliant and independent. Children are woven into different cultural practices and learn about the unique 
ranking and elaboration of various norms.  
(4) Children’s socio-moral behavior is also synchronized with historical and societal changes. 
With modernization and globalization, the scale and complexity of human communities have significantly 
increased, which may influence people’s socio-moral behavior. Recent research found that the bigger a 
community is, the more the community members would like to punish norm-violators; the more 
integrated a community’s market is (as indicated by the percentage of purchased calories), and the more 
people value fairness (Henrich, et al., 2010). The on-going change of societal complexity may indicate 
that each time period leaves a historically-distinctive imprint on the socio-moral behavior of children 
growing up in that period. For example, Chen and his colleagues (2005) found different patterns of 
relations between shyness and social adjustment in 3 cohorts (1990, 1998, and 2002) of elementary-
school children during multiple phases of the societal transition in China. Shyness was first associated 
with social and academic achievement in the 1990 cohort. Then, the associations became weaker in the 
1998 cohort, followed by shyness being associated with peer rejection, school problems, and depression 
in the 2002 cohort.  
Conclusion 
Infants and toddlers have rudimentary socio-moral expectations about actions and interactions 
within social contexts. They are sensitive to various markers of social groups and their expectations of 
reciprocity are modulated by considerations of ingroup loyalty. Socio-moral expectations emerge early in 
life and are more likely to be based on a small set of socio-moral principles. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the ingroup 
condition of Experiment 1 (with or without provocation). 
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Figure 2: Mean looking times at the one-block and some-towers events in the ingroup condition of 
Experiment 1 (with or without provocation). 
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Figure 3: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the 
outgroup condition of Experiment 2 (with or without provocation). 
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Figure 4: Mean looking times at the one-block and some-towers events in the outgroup condition of 
Experiment 2 (with or without provocation). 
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Figure 5: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the 
ingroup and outgroup conditions of Experiment 3 (with provocation). 
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Figure 6: Mean looking times at the one-block, some-towers, and all-towers events in the ingroup and 
outgroup conditions of Experiments 1 through 3 (with provocation). 
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Figure 7: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the outgroup 
condition of Experiment 4. 
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Figure 8: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the ingroup 
condition of Experiment 4. 
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Figure 9: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the 
outgroup-no-provocation condition of Experiment 4. 
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Figure 10: Mean looking times at the help and hinder event in the outgroup, outgroup no-provocation, 
and ingroup conditions of Experiments 4. 
. 
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Figure 11: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the 
outgroup condition of Experiment 5 (the presence or absence situation). 
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Figure 12: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the ingroup 
condition of Experiment 5 (the presence or absence situation). 
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Figure 13: Mean looking times at the help event in the outgroup and ingroup conditions of Experiments 5 
(the presence versus absence situation). 
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Figure 14: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization trials in the outgroup 
condition of Experiment 6. 
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Figure 15: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the test trial in the outgroup condition of 
Experiment 6. 
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Figure 16: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization trials in the ingroup 
condition of Experiment 6. 
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Figure 17: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the test trial in the outgroup condition of 
Experiment 6. 
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Figure 18: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the 
outgroup no-provocation condition of Experiment 6. 
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Figure 19: Mean looking times in the outgroup, outgroup no-provocation, and ingroup conditions of 
Experiment 6 and in the all-ingroup condition of Experiment 7. 
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Figure 20: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization trials in the all-ingroup 
condition of Experiment 7. 
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Figure 21: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the test trial in the all-ingroup condition of 
Experiment 7. 
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Figure 22: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the ingroup 
condition of Experiment 8. 
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Figure 23: Mean looking times at the refuse, accept, and coordinate events in the ingroup condition of 
Experiment 8 and in the outgroup condition of Experiment 9. 
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Figure 24: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the familiarization and test trials in the 
outgroup condition of Experiment 9. 
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Figure 25: Schematic drawing of the events shown during the test trial in the unmarked condition of 
Experiment 10. 
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Figure 26: Mean looking times at the refuse and coordinate events in the ingroup condition of 
Experiment 8, in the outgroup condition of Experiment 9, and in the unmarked condition of Experiment 
10. 
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